Human Rights Legislation and U.S. Foreign Policy by Weissbrodt, David
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY
David Weissbrodt*
INTRODUCTION
Several weeks before his election President Carter sketched some
of his intentions for the conduct of foreign policy:
I do not say that we can remake the world in our own image. I
recognize the limits on our power, and I do not wish to see us swing
from one extreme of cynical manipulation to the other extreme of
moralistic zeal, which can be just as dangerous. But the present
administration has been so obsessed with balance of power politics
that it has often ignored basic American values and a proper con-
cern for human rights. The leaders of this administration have
rationalized that there is little room for morality in foreign affairs,
and that we must put self-interest above principle. I disagree
strongly.
Ours is a great and powerful nation, committed to certain endur-
ing ideals, and those ideals must be reflected in our foreign policy.
There are practical, effective ways in which our power can be used
to alleviate human suffering around the world. We should begin by
having it understood that if any nation, whatever its political sys-
tem, deprives its people of basic human rights, that fact will help
shape our people's attitude toward that nation's government. If
other nations want our friendship and support, they must under-
stand that we want to see basic human rights respected.'
Was this statement campaign rhetoric? Of course. But President
Carter has repeated these thoughts often enough before the election,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; A.B., Columbia,1966; J.D., Univer-
sity of California (Berkeley), 1969.
Address by Jimmy Carter, B'nai B'rith Convention (Sept. 8, 1976) (paragraphing omit-
ted).
I See, e.g., Address by Jimmy Carter, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 15,
1976): "[Ilt must be the responsibility of the President to restore the moral authority of this
country in its conduct of foreign policy . . . Policies that strengthen dictators or create
refugees, policies that prolong suffering or postpone racial justice weaken that authority.
Policies that encourage economic progress and social justice promote it." Address by Jimmy
Carter, Foreign Policy Association-New York City (June 23, 1976):
We and our allies, in a creative partnership, can take the lead in establishing and
promoting basic global standards of human rights. We respect the independence
of all nations, but by our example, by our utterances, and by the various forms of
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and afterwards,3 so as to indicate more than a speech writer's turn
of phrase. In fact, Carter's human rights campaign has substantially
shifted the apparent direction of United States foreign policy.4
Part I of this article sets forth the historical precedents for the new
United States human rights activities.5 Part II then outlines the
human rights legislation which mandates and shapes the United
States human rights efforts.' Part III suggests a tentative approach
for pursuing the fundamental mandate of the human rights legisla-
tion to make internationally recognized human rights a central
focus of United States foreign policy.'
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The historical basis for the present human rights concern of the
United States Government comes from the late 18th century into
the early 20th century, when the United States regularly spoke out
in favor of at least two basic rights closely associated with the Amer-
ican national experience - the right of self-government and the
right to freedom of religion.'
As early as 1872 the United States joined with European powers
in calling upon the Romanian Government to cease its mistreat-
economic and political persuasion available to us, we can quite surely lessen the
injustice in this world. We must certainly try.
Address by Jimmy Carter, Center for Civil Rights and the Law School of the University of
Notre Dame (Oct. 10, 1976):
We should not insist on identical governments in all nations of the world . . . but
we cannot look away when a government tortures its own people or jails them for
their beliefs, or denies minorities fair treatment or the right to emigrate or the right
to worship. . . . We ought to speak out forcefully whenever there is human torture
in the world.
See, e.g., Address by President Carter, United Nations, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Mar.
18, 1977, at 10, col. 1; Walsh, Carter Stresses Arms and Rights in Policy Speech, Wash. Post,
Mar. 18, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 5; Gwertzman, Carter Urges U.N. to Step up Efforts for Human
Rights, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1977, at 1, col. 6; Transcript of the President's News Conference
on Foreign and Domestic Matters, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1977, at 26, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar.
8, 1977, at 3, col. 1; Hovey, Carter Denies U.S. Singles Out Soviet in Rights Protest, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 24, 1977, at 1, col. 6; Teltsch, U.S. Seeks Changes in U.N. 's Handling of Rights
Abuses, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1977, at 6, col. 1; Inaugural Address by President Carter, Jan.
20, 1977, reprinted in 123 CONG. REc. S1131 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1977).
See text infra at notes 151-57.
See text and notes 8-35 infra.
See text and notes 36-150 infra.
See text and notes 151-79 infra.
DFP'T STATE, United States Policy in the Promotion of Human Rights Abroad 1-2, 6
(unpublished memorandum 1976) [hereinafter cited as United States Policy in the Promo-
tion of Human Rights A broad].
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ment of Jews.' In 1880 the American minister to Russia informed the
foreign minister of that country that the United States "took a great
interest in the amelioration of the condition of [Jews] in other
countries" and that it hoped for a liberalization of Russian laws in
this regard." Following the Russian pogrom of 1903, President
Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hay made public
statements about the mistreatment of Jews is Russia." Similarly,
the United States Congress adopted a joint resolution in 1906
which stated that the people of the United States were "horrified"
by reports of the massacre of Russian Jews."
Just prior to World War I the United States Government at-
tempted through diplomatic means to halt the killing by the Turks
of some 200,000 Armenians. 3 And as early as 1935 the Ambassador
to Germany publicly and pointedly emphasized the need to respect
human rights in that country. 4 It was the horrors of that era that
I In early February 1872 "on the occurrence of the recent outrages," the United States
Consul in Bucharest addressed a note of "remonstrance" to the Romanian Government
regarding its failure to protect religious liberties of Jews in Moldavia and Wallachia. On April
18, 1872, the U.S. joined with the six European powers in a collective note characterizing the
violence against the Jews "as unworthy of a civilized country." [1872] H.R. EXEC. Doc. No.
318, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1872).
"1 United States Policy in the Promotion of Human Rights Abroad, supra note 8, at 7. In
September 1880 the United States Consul in St. Petersburg delivered a vigorous protest to
the Russian Foreign Minister regarding the expulsion of Jews from Russian cities. In particu-
lar, the United States objected to the expulsion of an American Jew, Henry Pinkos, "in the
presence of the fact that [Pinkos] has been ordered to leave Russia on no other ground than
that he is the professor of a particular creed or the holder of certain religious views." Letter
from the U.S. legation in St. Petersburg to the Russian Foreign Minister, [1880] Foreign Rel.
U.S. 873-82 (1880).
11 United States Policy in the Promotion of Human Rights Abroad, supra note 8, at 7-8;
see [1903] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 713 (1904).
" Pub. Res. No. 36 of June 26, 1906, 34 Stat. 835.
' See L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 181-94
(1973). [hereinafter cited as SoHN & BUERGENTHAL]. Diplomatic representations concerning
treatment of the Armenians began in the late 19th century and continued until the entry of
the United States into World War I in 1917. See, e.g., [1906] FoREIGN REL. U.S. 1417-19
(1909); [19151 id. at 981-90 (Supp. 1928); [19161 id. at 847-57 (Supp. 1929).
1, Ambassador William Dodd suggested a United States protest regarding discrimination
against American Jews recognizing that the German Government was "still very sensitive to
foreign criticism." [19351 2 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 410-12 (1952). In 1938 Secretary of State
Cordell Hull directed Ambassador Hugh Wilson to enter an "emphatic protest" against the
application to American citizens of a German decree which required all Jews, including
foreign nationals, to declare assets located in Germany. [1938] 2 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 369-70
(1955). In response to "wholesale arrests, plundering, pillaging and terrorizing of innocent and
helpless men and women throughout Germany," Ambassador Wilson was ordered to return
to the U.S. Id. at 396-98. See also United States Policy in the Promotion of Human Rights
Abroad, supra note 8, at 9.
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firmed the resolve of this nation and others to establish human
rights principles so that another such holocaust would never again
occur.'5
With the advent of the Cold War, however, the United States
concern for human rights became more selective.'6 The Government
protested vigorously against violations of human rights by Com-
munist governments which seized and maintained power in Eastern
Europe, 7 North Korea,'" Tibet,'9 and Cuba. 0 But the Government
fell strangely silent about massacres and other grave human rights
,1 Accordingly, human rights were significantly mentioned in: Roosevelt's Four Freedoms
speech of 1941, reprinted in 87 CONG. REc. 44, 46-47 (1941); The Atlantic Charter, 55 Stat.
1603 (1942); The Yalta Declaration of Liberated Europe, [1945] FOREIGN REL. U.S. CONFER-
ENCES AT MALTA AND YALTA 968 (1955); the peace treaties with the defeated powers, see, e.g.,
Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490, entered into force
Apr. 28, 1952; Convention in Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
of Germany, 6 U.S.T. 5599, T.I.A.S. No. 3425, entered into force Oct. 23, 1954; the North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241 (1950), T.I.A.S. No. 1964, entered into
force Aug. 24, 1949. The United States was instrumental in establishing respect for human
rights as a central obligation of the U.N. Charter, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), 16 U.S.T. 1134,
T.I.A.S. No. 5857; U.N. CHARTER, preamble, arts. 55, 56, and in further defining these duties
in 1948 by the U.N. General Assembly adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. See International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, infra note 16, at 337. See
also Henkin, The United States and the Crises in Human Rights, 14 VA. J. IrN'L L. 653, 654
(1974). Still further definition was supplied by the O.A.S. acceptance of the American Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Res. XXX), adopted by the Ninth International
Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, Mar. 30 - May 2, 1948. PAN AMERICAN
UNION, FINAL ACT OF THE NINTH CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES 38-45 (Washington, D.C.,
1948).
'1 See generally, International Protection of Human Rights: The Work of International
Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements of the Howe Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as International Protection of Human Rights Hearings].
See also Salzberg & Young, The Parliamentary Role in Implementing International Human
Rights: A U.S. Example, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 251 (1977).
' See, e.g., Concern over violation of Civil Liberties in Bulgaria, 16 DEP'T STATE BULL.
1218 (1947); United States, France, and the United Kingdom condemn the Soviet takeover
in Czechoslovakia, 18 id. at 304 (1948); U.S. objection to trials of Bulgarians opposed to
Communism, 19 id. at 710 (1948); statement by Secretary of State Acheson, 20 id. at 611
(1949); note of protest regarding "ruthless measures" taken by the Hungarian Government,
25 id. at 94 (1951). See generally Stone, American Support of Free Elections in Eastern
Europe, 17 id. at 407 (1947); Soviet Violations of Treaty Obligations, 18 id. at 738 (1948);
diplomatic correspondence to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, 20 id. at 755 (1949).
See, e.g., statement by Secretary of State Dulles, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 758 (1948).
" See, e.g., statement by Acting Secretary of State Herter, 40 DEP'T STATE BULL. 514-15
(1959). See also United Nations Resolution on Tibet, 10 INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS BULL. 37-40
(1960).
" See, e.g., U.S. protest regarding trials of U.S. citizens in Cuba, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL.
814 (1960); U.S. and Soviet Union messages regarding events in Cuba, 44 id. at 661-67 (1961).
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violations in Algeria (1958),1 South Africa (1960),2 Indonesia
(1965),23 Burundi (1971),4 East Pakistan (1971),25 and the Sudan
(1971).6 Finally, in pursuit of his policies of detente, Secretary Kis-
2, See policy statement regarding Algeria by Secretary of State Dulles, 37 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 14 (1957); statement by U.N. Ambassador Lodge, 36 id. at 421 (1957). See generally
France and the Rule of Law in Algeria, 7 INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS BULL. 14-20 (1957); The
Algerian Conflict and the Rule of Law, 11 id. at 5-20 (1960).
2 See statement by U.N. Ambassador Lodge, 42 DEP'T STATE BULL. 668-69 (1960); SOHN &
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 13, at 672-89.
See Joint Communique issued following the visit of Ambassador Bunker to Indonesia,
52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 654-55 (1965); statements by Secretary of State Rusk, 52 id. at 447
(1965), 54 id. at 923 (1966).
" International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 16, at 65-70, 974-81.
21 Id. at 421-32, 913-29.
28 See 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 191, 194 (1972). Despite these noticeable lapses in its concern
for human rights, however, the government continued to promote self-determination for
colonial peoples (except in Algeria, Bangladesh, and the formerly Portuguese areas of South-
ern Africa) and to assist in the formulation of international human rights standards by
participating in the drafting of a number of important international human rights instru-
ments. See generally Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights
in COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
39, 43-56 (1968). Among the most important of these documents were the following:
a) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1967);
b) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976; G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967);
c) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, G.A. Res. 2106, U.N.
GAOR Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N. T.S. 195. See N. NATHANSON & E.
SCHWELB, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS TREATY ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 2-4
(1975);
d) American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, OASOR,
OEA/Ser. K/XVI/I.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1971).
e) Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, adopted by the General Confer-
ence of the International Labor Organization at its Fortieth Session, June 25, 1957, entered
into force Jan. 17, 1959, 320 U.N.T.S. 292. But see Schmidhouser & Berg, The American Bar
Association and the Human Rights Conventions: The Political Significance of Private Profes-
sional Associations, 38 SocIAL RESEARCH 362 (1971).
Despite participation in the initial formulation of major U.N. human rights instruments,
this country found itself unable to ratify these same instruments due largely to congressional
opposition during the early 1950's. Several members of the Congress, including most promi-
nently Senator Bricker, became fearful that the Genocide Convention and the various U.N.
treaty drafts which later became the bases for the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination might establish a basis for international scrutiny of domestic human rights
practices, particularly the practice of racial discrimination, and might infringe on perogatives
of the states in the United States federal system. See remarks by Senator Bricker, 98 CONG.
REC. 907-14 (1952); see also Hearings on S.J. Res. I and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of
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the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 10-11 (1953) (Bricker attack on the
International Covenants); Bricker & Webb, The Bricker Amendment-Treaty Law vs. Do-,
mestic Constitutional Law, 29 NOTRE DAME LAw. 529 (1954). As a result of these concerns, a
series of proposals known popularly as the Bricker Amendment were introduced to amend
the United States Constitution so as to restrict the government from entering into interna-
tional agreements which might infringe on the powers of the states or which might be applica-
ble domestically in courts without implementing legislation. The various versions of the
Bricker Amendment are reproduced in 12 Rac. N. Y. Crry B. A. 320, 343-46 (1957).
An amended version of the Bricker Amendment failed by only one vote to pass the Senate
in 1954. 100 CONG. REc. 2251 (Feb. 26, 1954). To secure the defeat of the Amendments
Secretary of State Dulles was forced to make a commitment that this country did "not intend
to become a party to any such covenant [on human rights] or present it as a treaty for
consideration by the Senate." See Hearings on S.J. Res. I and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 825 (1953). Dulles also
indicated that the United States would not sign the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, nor would the Eisenhower Administration seek ratification of the Genocide Conven-
tion. Schmidhauser & Berg, The American Bar Association and the Human Rights Conven-
tions, 38 SOCIAL RESEARCH 362 (1971). See also Buergenthal, International Human Rights:
U.S. Policy and Priorities, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 613 (1974).
The Kennedy Administration attempted to relax the 1953 Dulles Doctrine, submitting
three minor human rights conventions to the Senate for approval. However, only one of these
instruments, the Supplementary Slavery Convention, was eventually acceded to by the
United States. See International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 16, at 266;
113 CONG. Rxc. 15750-51 (1967); see generally, Hearings on Human Rights Conventions Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1967). The
two major covenants on Human Rights and the Racial Discrimination Convention were never
even submitted to the Senate for consideration.
With the enactment of civil rights legislation, the announcement of court decisions to
eradicate some of the worst injustices of racial discrimination, the related decrease in interest
about States rights, and the increasing interest in international human rights, the climate
for ratification of these multilateral treaties has considerably improved. In 1974, the report
of Rep. Donald Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements listed
29 human rights conventions which the United States had not ratified and recommended
immediate ratification. Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership,
Report of the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 24 (1974). In 1976 further inroads into the Dulles
Doctrine have finally been made. In January 1976, the Senate ratified the Inter-American
Convention on Granting of Political Rights to Women and the UN. Convention on the Poli-
tical Rights of Women, 122 CONG. Rxc. S356-57 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1976). The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide may be nearing Senate ratifica-
tion now that the American Bar Association has reversed its long-standing opposition to the
treaty. See Comment, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16 HARv. INT'L
L. J. 683 (1975). While campaigning for the Presidency, Carter pledged:
Insofar as they comply with our own Constitution and laws, we should move toward
Senate ratification of several important treaties drafted in the United Nations for
the protection of human rights. These include the Genocide Convention that was
prepared more than 25 years ago, the Convention against racial discrimination that
was signed during the Johnson Administration, and the covenants on political and
civil rights, and on economic and social rights. Until we ratify these covenants we
cannot participate with other nations in international discussions of specific cases
involving freedom and human rights.
Address by Jimmy Carter, B'nai B'rith Convention, note 1 supra.
And, in a speech before the United Nations, President Carter again promised:
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singer began even to desist from discussing human rights problems
in Communist countries."
I will seek Congressional approval and sign the U.N. covenants on economic, social
and cultural rights. And I will work closely with our Congress in seeking to support
the ratification of not only these two instruments, but the United Nations Genocide
Convention and the Treaty for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion as well.
Address by President Carter, United Nations, note 3 supra.
Ratification by the United States would significantly contribute to United Nations efforts
to implement human rights. By ratifying the Racial Discrimination Convention and the two
International Covenants on Human Rights, the United States would obtain a voice in the
interpretation and enforcement of those instruments so as to make them more effective in
insuring human rights around the world. Also, those international instruments will have an
impact on the interpretation of sections 116 and 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act.
Secretary Kissinger mentioned human rights particularly during his last year, but his
rhetoric may not have been translated into his policies. See, e.g., Address by Secretary
Kissinger, Synagogue Council of America, Nov. 15, 1976, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 600, in
which Secretary Kissinger listed among the three great challenges confronting the United
States the defense of the "rights and dignity of man." He did, however, suggest that human
rights concerns must remain secondary to United States interests in maintaining peace and
world order. See, e.g., remarks quoted in 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 529 (1973):
We shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We shall urge
humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But the issues come
down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we press without provoking the
Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase
international tensions? Are we ready to face the crises and increased defense budg-
ets that a return to cold war conditions would spawn?
See also Kissinger's response to a question posed during an interview on Face the Nation in
October, 1976:
In foreign policy, the United States has two objectives - at least two objectives.
One is to maintain our security and the security of our allies. The second one is to
live in a world which is compatible with our values. Both of these objectives are
irnp .tant. We therefore, wherever we possibly can, try to encourage political forces
that represent humane values and the democratic values for which we stand. ...
At the same time, there are certain security requirements. And you cannot imple-
ment your values unless you survive.
75 STATE DEP'T BULL. 607-08 (1976).
Where security and human rights interests were in conflict, Kissinger suggested that a very
inclusive view of the security interest must always predominate. Thus, for example, in allo-
cating foreign aid Kissinger believed the United States should be willing to overlook human
rights violations in situations where continued good relations with a country advanced world
peace:
It is our obligation as the world's leading democracy to dedicate ourselves to assur-
ing freedom for the human spirit. But responsibility compels also a recognition of
our limits. Our alliances. . . serve the cause of peace by strengthening regional and
world security. If well conceived, they are not favors to others but a recognition of
common interest. They should be withdrawn when those interests change; they
should not, as a general rule, be used as levers to extort a standard of conduct or
to punish acts with which we do not agree.
75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 603 (1976).
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Since Congress believed that the State Department was unwilling
actively to pursue human rights objectives, the Congress saw an
opportunity to make human rights a focus for a larger congressional
role in United States foreign policy-making.2s In 1973 concern "over
rampant violations of human rights and the need for a more effec-
tive response from both the United States and the world com-
munity" prompted the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on In-
ternational Organizations to commence an extensive series of hear-
ings.29 These hearings chaired by Representative Donald Fraser of
See also Kissinger's statement to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations in which he asserted that withdrawal of assistance "is an
extreme measure that harms our other objectives while holding little promise for effecting
desirable changes . . . Moreover, such withdrawal, or even the threat of withdrawal, depre-
ciates the strength of the mutual defense relationship which we share with our allies and offers
encouragement to potential enemies." Dept. of State, The Secretary of State, Mar. 26, 1976,
at 4. But see, Address by Secretary Kissinger, Upper Midwest Council on Foreign Relations,
July 15, 1975, 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 161: "We do not and will not condone repressive practices.
This is not only dictated by our values but also a reflection of the reality that regimes which
lack legitimacy or moral authority are inherently vulnerable. There will therefore be limits
to the degree to which such regimes can be congenial partners."
Finally, Kissinger's statements regarding human rights reflect a general skepticism as to
the ability of the United States to effect the policies of other governments, and a consequen-
tial rejection of bold pronouncements on human rights in favor of more subtle human rights
initiatives:
We are concerned . . . that when sensitive issues are transformed into tests of
strength between governments, the impulse for national prestige will defeat the
most worthy goals. We have generally opposed attempts to deal with sensitive
international human rights issues through legislation, not because of the moral view
expressed, which we share, but because legislation is almost always too inflexible,
too public, and too heavyhanded a means to accomplish what it seeks.
75 D-P'T STATE BULL. 603 (1976).
2' Members of the Congress were dissatisfied with the Republican Administration's atti-
tude towards foreign affairs. See, e.g., statements by Senators Clark, Kennedy, Abourezk and
Cranston in 122 CONG. Rxc. S16968 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976). The role of human rights in
United States foreign policy was, however, only a small part of the more general conflict
between Congress and the previous Administration as to the leadership of this country. See,
e.g., statements by members of Congress reacting to President Nixon's impoundment of
funds, 117 id. 8567 (1971) (remarks of Senator Ervin); id. at 12085 (remarks of Congressman
O'Neill); 122 id. S12538 (daily ed. July 27, 1976) (remarks of Senator Humphrey concerning
the Congress and Foreign Policy).
" Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership: Report of the
Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movement of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fraser Subcommittee Report].
During the 94th Congress, the Fraser Subcommittee conducted a total of 40 hearings relating
to human rights problems in 18 different countries: Chile, South Korea, the Philippines, the
Soviet Union, South Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia, Paraguay, Indonesia, Iran, Cuba, Haiti,
North Korea, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uruguay, El Salvador, Argentina, and India. See 122
CONG. REc. E5440 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks by Rep. Fraser). In addition, during the
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Minnesota and the resulting Subcommittee reports have heralded
a new era in United States foreign policy in regard to human rights.30
At the conclusion of its first round of hearings, the Subcommittee
in 1974 issued a brief 54-page report entitled "Human Rights and
the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership." 3' The basic
conclusion of the Subcommittee was that "the human rights factor
93d Congress, the Subcommittee investigated human rights violations in Brazil and Syria.
Since the international human rights movement lacks a completely independent and uni-
versally recognized method for reliably determining the facts as to alleged human rights
violations, the Subcommittee and other congressional hearings have afforded and continue
to afford an opportunity for the evidence to be aired and United States policy to be analyzed.
See International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 16, at 3. The Fraser
hearings result in more than publicity, however; congressional hearings have a significant
visibility and respect. They afford an opportunity for the presentation of conflicting views
and the questioning of witnesses. The hearings have required the State Department to use
its considerable information gathering resources and thus sometimes to verify and to publi-
cize human rights violations. See, e.g., Human Rights in South Korea: Implications for US.
Policy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations and Subcomm. on Asian and
Pacific Affairs, of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (testimony
of Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dept. of
State). On other occasions, the hearings have afforded a platform for State Department
apologies for repressive governments. See, e.g., Dep't of State News Release, Sept. 8, 1976
(statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs before the Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations of the House Int'l Relations Comm.
regarding human rights in Iran).
Most nations probably do not distinguish, as more sophisticated domestic observers might,
between congressional hearings and the official position of the United States government. For
example, when there were congressional hearings recently concerning Argentina, the Argen-
tine government protests made it quite clear that the government of Argentina did not
understand how easy it is for a single Representative to hold a congressional hearing. The
Argentine response also showed the considerable sensitivity of that government to criticism.
See, e.g., Duiguid, Argentine Charges U.S. "Interference," Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1976, § A, at
17, col. 1; see also Omang, Argentina Hires U.S. Company to Improve Image, Wash. Post,
Dec. 28, 1976, § A, at 9, col. 1; and see generally Human Rights in Argentina, Hearings before
the Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
In sum, these congressional hearings represent a way by which the United States govern-
ment can take official notice of human rights violations and involve a certain implicit threat
that Congress may use the information obtained to impose aid, trade, or other sanctions
against the human rights violators. This combination of a fact-finding mechanism with the
implicit threat of sanctions may have gradually made the hearings one of the most potent
weapons in the human rights arsenal of the United States during a period when the Adminis-
tration refused actively to pursue human rights.
30 See J. Salzberg, The Parliamentary Role in the International Protection of Human
Rights: The Recent Example of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and
Movements (unpublished memorandum, Dec. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Salzberg]; see also
note 35 infra.
1' Fraser Subcommittee Report, supra note 29.
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is not accorded the high priority it deserves in our country's foreign
policy."32 The report observed:
[Too often human rights] becomes invisible on the vast foreign
policy horizon of political, economic and military affairs ....
Unfortunately, the prevailing attitude has led the United States
into embracing governments which practice torture and una-
bashedly violate almost every human rights guarantee pronounced
by the world community. Through foreign aid and occasional inter-
vention - both overt and covert - the United States supports
those governments .33
The Fraser Subcommittee report makes 29 recommendations for
United States action. 34 The Congress and the State Department
have accepted several of the recommendations and have thus sub-
stantively changed the direction of United States human rights
policy.35
32 Id. at 9.
Id.
1 Id. at 3-8: see Salzberg, supra note 30, at 3-9. Although the Fraser Subcommittee recom-
mended that the United States maintain diplomatic relations with countries that violate
human rights guarantees, other nations have severed relations on human rights grounds. See,
e.g., Omang, Venezuela Breaks Ties to Uruguary, Wash. Post, July 7, 1976, § A, at 21, col.
1.
35 The State Department has, for example, appointed a Coordinator for Humanitarian
Affairs and human rights officers in each of the five regional bureaus of the Department and
in the Legal Advisor's office. See Letter from former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Inger-
soll to Rep. Thomas Morgan, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 28,
1975; Dep't of State airgram, Feb. 14, 1975, U.S. State Dep't Report to Congress on the
Human Rights Situation in Countries Receiving U.S. Security Assistance, at Tab A (1975)
[hereinafter cited as 1975 State Department Report]. James M. Wilson was appointed to
the post of Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in August 1974. United States Policy and
Human Rights, 14 REv. INT'L COMM'N OF JURIsTs 25 (1975). See statement of James M. Wilson
in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 4, 1975).
Congress in 1976 made the position of Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs a post subject to Senate confirmation. Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 301(a) (June 30, 1976);
90 Stat. 748 (1976). Mr. Wilson was never confirmed for the post. Patricia Derian was
selected by the Carter Administration as Coordinator. Lereaze, Human Rights Backlash
Concerns U.S. Officials, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1977, § A, at 20, col. 2. She has indicated a need
for a staff larger than the two or three persons who served with Mr. Wilson. Id. Also, persons
responsible for human rights have been designated in the operating bureaus as well as in the
regional bureaus of the State Department, the Policy Planning Staff, Congressional Rela-
tions, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the Agency for International Development,
the staff of the National Security Council, and elsewhere in the Administration. See Partici-
pants, Informal Interagency Meeting on Human Rights, Feb. 2, 1977. For a further discussion
of the increased human rights bureaucracy in the State Department, see Note, Role of Non-
Governmental Organizations in Implementing Human Rights in Latin America, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 477, 501 (1977).
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II. THE NEW HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
The most important outgrowth of the Fraser hearings may have
been human rights legislation. Congress began with a very tenta-
tive, noncoercive and limited initiative. In the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1973,31 the Congress enacted section 32 which declared the
"sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or
military assistance to the government of any foreign country which
practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens
for political purposes. '37 It should be noted that this provision did
not purport to address any specific country, group of countries, or
any human right of particular interest to the United States, but
expressed a more general human rights concern. 38
When the initiative was largely ignored by the State Depart-
ment,31 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 added a new section,
502B.40 Section 502B stated the "sense of Congress. . . that, except
in extraordinary circumstances, the President shall substantially
3 87 Stat. 714 (1973).
3, § 32, 87 Stat. 714, 733 (1973).
3 Compare Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2432 (Supp.
1977); Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974 (Stevenson amendment) § 8(b), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 635e(b) (Supp. 1976); see text at notes 140-50 infra; Right to Food Resolution, H. Con. Res.
737, passed House Sept. 21, 1976, 122 CONG. REc. H10715-16; Sen. Con. Res. 138, passed the
Senate Sept. 16, 1976, H. Con. Res. 726, passed by House, Sept. 20, 1976, passed by Senate,
Oct. 1, 1976; see 122 CONG. REc. S17580 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (urging release of Russian
Baptist pastor); see also 122 CONG. REC. H. 10548 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1976) (consideration of
H. Con. Res. 726 by the House).
" In April 1974 the Department cabled instructions to 68 diplomatic posts - including all
countries receiving military or economic aid - calling for an assessment of section 32 of the
1973 Foreign Assistance Act on the status of the foreign aid programs in each country. Fiscal
Year 1975 Foreign Assistance Request: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 283 (1974). See 1975 State Department Report, supra note 35, at 2; see
generally Salzburg, supra note 30, at 25. Later in 1974 all embassies were asked "to transmit
the text of Section 32 to governments of [aid-recipient] countries and to explain the serious-
ness with which the United States regards this section." See letter from Deputy Secretary of
State Robert Ingersoll to Rep. Thomas Morgan, Chairman of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, June 27, 1974, in 120 CONG. REc. H. 6688-89 (daily ed. July 17, 1974). Deputy Secre-
tary of State Ingersoll, testifying at the 1974 foreign aid hearings, informed the committee
that the reporting and review features under section 32 would be a "permanent part of the
State Department's fact-finding and decision-making process with respect to all countries"
- not only aid-recipient countries. Fiscal Year 1975 Foreign Assistance Request Hearings,
supra at 286. Despite these promises, however, Congress saw no evidence that section 32
changed the State Department's policies in regard to any single country. Furthermore, the
State Department did not appear to use any information collected as a result of the cables
in its policy deliberations.
40 88 Stat. 1795 (1974).
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reduce or terminate security assistance to any government which
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights. ... "' This section gives concrete exam-
ples of "gross violations" - torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges or
other flagrant denials of life, or security of a person. 2 If assistance
were furnished notwithstanding gross human rights violations, the
President was required to report to Congress the extraordinary cir-
cumstances necessitating the assistance.43 Extraordinary circum-
stances were not defined. Again, Congress did not take a coercive
measure, either out of concern for the President's traditional preem-
inence in foreign affairs" or because of an awareness as to the diffi-
culties of imposing human rights standards on aid-recipient coun-
tries.4 5
" Id. § 46, 88 Stat. 1795, 1815, § 546 (1974):
Section 502B. Human Rights. - (a) It is the sense of Congress that, except in
extraordinary circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce or terminate
security assistance to any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without
charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, and the security of the
person.
(b) Whenever proposing or furnishing security assistance to any government
falling within the provisions of paragraph (a), the President shall advise the Con-
gress of the extraordinary circumstances necessitating the assistance.
(c) In determining whether or not a government falls within the provisions of
subsection (a), consideration shall be given to the extent of cooperation by such
government in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights by appropriate international organizations, in-
cluding the International Committee of the Red Cross and any body acting under
the authority of the United Nations or of the Organization of American States.
(d) For purposes of this section, "security assistance" means assistance under
chapter 2 (military assistance) or chapter 4 (security supporting assistance of this
part), assistance under part V (Indochina Postwar Reconstruction) or part VI (Mid-
dle East Peace) of this Act, sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act, or assistance
for public safety under this or any other Act.
42 Id.
" Id.; see also text at notes 133-38 infra.
" See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); R. WALTON, CONGRESS
AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1973); F. WILCox, CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE AND FOREIGN
POuCY (1971); L. HENKIN, FOREIGNAFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITTrrIoN 37 (1972); see also Congress
and Foreign Policy: Report of the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); Congress and Foreign Policy: Hear-
ings Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); cf. W. CHIrmCK, STATE DEPARTMENT, PRESS, AND
PRESSURE GRoups: A ROLE ANALYSIS 18-20 (1970).
,3 See, e.g., International Protection of Human Rights Hearings supra note 16, at 433-37;
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While the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act brought congressional at-
tention to bear on human rights in regard to military assistance, the
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 tied the
receipt of economic assistance to a human rights standard.46 The
Act adds a new section, 116, which was similar to section 502B.
However, the completely noncoercive "sense of Congress" language
was significantly removed: "No [economic] assistance may be pro-
vided to a government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights . . . . 47
It was apparently possible to strengthen somewhat the human
rights aid cut-off provisions in section 116 because of a strange con-
gressional alliance between two quite different groups: representa-
see also note 27 supra and text at notes 88-89, 173-79, 181-83 infr.
,l 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n (Pamph. Supp. 1, 1976). This provision is known as the Harkin
Amendment for its principal House sponsor Representative Harkin of Iowa.
," 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n(a) (Pamph. Supp. 1, 1976). Section 116 in its entirety reads as
follows:
Sec. 116. Human Rights. - (a) No assistance may be provided under this part
to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without
charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of
person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such coun-
try.
(b) In determining whether this standard is being met with regard to funds
allocated under this part, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives may require
the Administrator primarily responsible for administering part I of this Act to
submit in writing information demonstrating that such assistance will directly
benefit the needy people in such country, together with a detailed explanation of
the assistance to be provided (including the dollar amounts of such assistance) and
explanation of how such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such
country. If either committee or either House of Congress disagrees with the Admin-
istrator's justification, it may initiate action to terminate assistance to any country
by a concurrent resolution under section 617 of this Act.
(c) In determining whether or not a government falls within the provisions of
subsection (a), consideration shall be given to the extent of cooperation of such
government in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights by appropriate international organizations, in-
cluding the International Committee of the Red Cross, or groups or persons acting
under the authority of the United Nations or of the Organization of American
States.
(d) The President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, in the annual presentation
materials on proposed economic development assistance programs, a full and com-
plete report regarding the steps he has taken to carry out the provisions of this
section.
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tives who disliked foreign economic assistance and members of Con-
gress who were most concerned about human rights, but would ordi-
narily have supported aid.4" The removal of the "sense of Congress"
language was also prompted by frustration at what was perceived
to be the continuing State Department resistance to congressional
human rights initiatives49 and by increasing congressional confid-
1, E. Snyder, Background Paper on U.S. Human Rights Legislation, Oct. 22, 1976, at 2-3
(unpublished memorandum). Some commentators have begun to credit nongovernmental
lobbyists with the passage of this human rights legislation. E.g., Ottaway, The Growing
Lobby for Human Rights, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1976, §B, at 5, col. 1.
In fact, nongovernmental organizations generally concerned with human rights devoted no
significant attention to Congress during the critical formative period 1973 through 1975. It
was individual members of Congress, including most prominently Senators Abourezk, Cran-
ston, and Humphrey and Representatives Fraser and Harkin with their staffs, who drafted
and generated the political will necessary to achieve passage of section 116 (the Harkin
Amendment) and section 502B. A few scholars and international nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) were asked by Congress to provide factual information about human rights
violations around the world and about international procedures for human rights implemen-
tation. See International Protection of Human Rights Hearings, supra note 16. The impulse
for legislative action came almost entirely from Congress-not the NGOs.
By January 1976 a group of church-related organizations which had previously been con-
cerned about peace issues became attracted to the already existing human rights activity on
Capitol Hill. It took these organizations several months to learn about and to establish them-
selves in the human rights field. The present version of section 502B had already been drafted
in December 1975 and none of the newly interested organizations had any significant hand
in either its drafting or its eventual enactment in June 1976. Nevertheless, the "human rights
lobby" may soon begin to have a considerable influence on how sections 116 and 502B are
implemented by the State Department or extended by Congress.
" See 121 CONG. REc. S21276-78 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). In
response to enactment of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, the State Department cabled
instructions to all diplomatic posts in January and February of 1975 requesting updated
reporting on significant human rights developments. 1975 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra
note 35, at App. 2 (cable of Jan. 17, 1975 to all diplomatic posts); see id. at App. 5-6 (airgram
of Feb. 14, 1975). The cable specified that "facts obtained from this reporting would be used
in formulating U.S. policy in considering country by country" what the United States should
do "to promote respect for and observance of human rights both for their own sake and in
response to increasing Congressional interest." Id. at App. 2. In response to these instructions,
each post submitted to the State Department a classified analysis of the human rights
situation in the country in which it was located. Despite the expansive promises of State
Department cooperation with congressional human rights initiatives, however, the first
"State Department Report to Congress on the Human Rights Situation in Countries Receiv-
ing U.S. Security Assistance" was a grave disappointment when it arrived on Capitol Hill in
November 1975. 1975 STATE DEPARTMENT REPoRT, supra note 35. The Report did not mention
a single country as violating human rights, nor did it attempt to set out the objective facts
in those countries receiving aid. Such a factual report was apparently prepared, but Secretary
Kissinger suppressed the more informative document, on the ground that "since all but a
handful of countries committed human rights violations it served no useful purpose to specify
for criticism American allies and friends." Gwertzman, U.S. Blocks Rights Data on Nations
Getting Arms, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1975, at 14, col. 6. Instead, the report blandly asserted
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ence that human rights legislation was possible.
Removal of the "sense of Congress" language hardly made aid
termination mandatory upon the Administration, however. Under
section 116 aid may be provided notwithstanding human rights vio-
lations if the "assistance will directly benefit the needy people in
such a country."50 If Congress believes basic rights are being denied
by an aid-recipient government, the Agency for International Devel-
opment (AID) must provide information demonstrating that assis-
tance would directly benefit "needy people." If Congress finds the
AID assurances unconvincing, a concurrent resolution can termi-
nate aid.5' As under section 502B, Congress required the President
to report annually on steps taken to carry out the law. 5 But section
that "some countries, of course, present more serious evidence of violations than others.
Repressive laws and actions, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, torture or cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment . . . are not extraordinary events in the world
community . 1975 STATE DEPARTMENT REPo'r, supra note 35, at 3. The report therefore
concluded:
In view of the widespread nature of human rights violations in the world, we have
found no adequately objective way to make distinctions of degree between nations.
This fact leads us . . .to the conclusion that neither the U.S. security interests nor
the human rights cause would be properly served by the public obloquy and im-
paired relations with security recipient countries that would follow the making of
inherently subjective U.S. Government determinations that 'gross violations' do or
do not exist ....
Id. at 5.
" 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n(a) (Pamph. Supp. I, 1976). The section "is designed to provide
safeguards against the possibility that authoritarian governments which deprive their citizens
of basic political and human liberties do not divert U.S. assistance from its intended purposes
or use such assistance to bolster their repressive regimes." S. REP. No. 406, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 34-35 (1975).
5' Id. § 2151n(b); see 22 U.S.C.A. § 2367 (Supp. 1976) regarding termination of assistance
by Congress.
1, International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 § 166(d), 89 Stat. 849 (1975).
Congress has also passed human rights provisions conditioning the U.S. contribution to the
African Development Fund and to the Inter-American Development Bank. 22 U.S.C.A. §§
283y, 290g-9 (Supp. 1976), Pub. L. No. 94-302 (May 31, 1976). Section 211 directs the U.S.
Executive Director of the African Development Fund to vote against any loan or extension
of financial or technical assistance "to any country which engages in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." 22 U.S.C.A. § 290g-9 (Supp.
1976). See generally The African Development Fund, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Development Institutions and Finance of the House Comm. on Banking, Cur-
rency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Similarly, section 103 directs the Executive
Director to vote against loans or extension of assistance to countries that violate the human
rights standard. In June 1976 the acting U.S. bank director cast the only vote against a $21
million loan to Chile. The United States Director "cited the findings of the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission as showing a pattern of Chilean violations that precluded U.S.
approval .... " Diuguid, US. Vote on Chile Loan Stirs Question, Wash. Post, July 9, 1976,
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116 does not require that the Administration explain what human
rights information it considered in determining if aid should be
granted. The "needy people" exclusion is also very difficult to define
and allows the Agency for International Development great discre-
tion.5'
Potentially, the most significant human rights legislation to date,
however, was the revised section 502B in the International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 4 which was passed
by clear majorities in both Houses. President Ford initially vetoed
the measure on several grounds, 5 partially because of his concern
that a provision permitting Congress to veto foreign aid for a partic-
ular country on human rights grounds, by concurrent resolution of
either House, infringed upon the Presidential prerogatives in foreign
affairs. 56 After altering the amended section 502B to require a joint
§A, at 2, col. 1. See also notes 98-99 infra.
Every major foreign aid or trade bill in the coming years may contain similar human rights
provisions, as Congress asserts its increasing interest in controlling foreign policy and particu-
larly human rights policy. See Gwertzman, U.S. for Rights Curb on World Bank Loan, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 24, 1977, at 1, col. 5; see also statement of William Goodfellow and James
Morrell, Associates of the Center for International Policy, before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Development Institutions of the House Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Comm.,
Mar. 24, 1977 [hereinafter Goodfellow & Morrell Statement]. This statement concerned
H.R. 4842, a bill to provide additional financing for the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank. In their testimony, Goodfellow and Morrell urged Congress to include a provision in
the legislation mandating a "no" vote on loans to gross and consistent human rights violators.
Id. at 12. Multilateral funding is becoming an important part of the United States foreign
aid picture. Foreign Aid: Evading the Control of Congress, 3 INT'L. POL'Y 1 (Jan. 1977); see,
e.g., Dole, World Bank Votes Loans to Chile of $60 Million, with U.S. in Favor, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 22, 1976, at 3, col. 2; Southerland, Congress Eyes Indirect Aid to Chile, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Dec. 1, 1976, at 1, col. 3. There has also been a considerable shift from bilateral aid
to private loans. Oberdorfer, Banks, not U.S., Now Give Brazil Its Foreign Aid, Wash. Post,
Mar. 20, 1977, §A, at 1, col. 6.
Such provisions tying multilateral or bilateral aid to other policy objectives may become
rather common and may not be limited to the human rights field. For example, the Congress
has similarly instructed the United States representative to the International Development
Association to vote against loans for the benefit of any country that has failed to become a
party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 22 U.S.C.A. § 284 (1976).
w 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n(b) (Pamph. Supp. I, 1976); see Breslin, Human Rights: Rhetoric or
Action?, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1977, §C, at 1, col. 3; see also Goodfellow & Morrell
Statement, supra note 52. The legislative history on this exception for aid to "needy people"
is not very enlightening. See 121 CONG. REc. H8608 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1975); see infra note
93, at 111.
54 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304 (Pamph. Supp. I, Pt, 1, 1976).
" See 122 CONG. REc. S6715 (daily ed. May 10, 1976).
5 The President's position may have been founded upon the veto power in Article I, § 7,
cl. 3 of the Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote
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to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United
States; and before the same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him .... " If read
literally this clause might require the President's approval of every "vote" of either House of
the Congress, even if the "vote" were preliminary to final approval of legislation. The word
"necessary" may be read, however, to relate to other constitutional provisions, such as Article
I, § 7, cl. 2, involving the exercise of legislative powers. Accordingly, the President would
argue that for an "order, resolution, or vote" to have legislative effect, the President must be
given an opportunity to exercise the veto power.
Furthermore, the President might contend that the policy decisions and legal consequences
of a legislative veto are indistinguishable from the impact of ordinary legislation. The result
of such provisions might be to exclude the President from decisions of Congress which in their
effect are indistinguishable from statutes and which are the type of basic decisions which
Article I, § 7 requires to be submitted to the President. The purpose of the veto provision is
to insure that the President's role in the legislative process should not be eliminated merely
by giving legislative decisions another name.
Congressional supporters of the legislative veto may point out that the President is afforded
an opportunity to exercise a veto over the statute containing the legislative veto provision.
Accordingly, the fact that the legislative veto provision must at some point be signed by the
President serves the policies of Article I, § 7. It might also be argued that the legislative veto
is not a form of legislation because it does not, of its own, have the force of law, but rather
derives its force from the enabling act. Also, action under the veto, unlike a new legislative
act, represents no inherent change in policy since it was contemplated in the enabling act.
However, the President might contend that the legislative veto allows Congress to interfere
in the enforcement of the law and thus intrude upon executive functions, such as the power
to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States. Congressional supporters of the legislative
veto might, instead, point to the Congress' power of the purse and right to pass legislation.
During World War HI Congress began to enact legislation which permitted Congress to pass
a concurrent resolution and thus limit the President's power for directing the war effort, lend
lease, price control, and labor dispute resolution. Furthermore, Congress delegated to itself
the power to veto by resolution of either House, the President's executive reorganization
plans. There are at least 20 statutes which permit legislative veto by concurrent resolution;
19 statutes allow either House of Congress to veto executive action, and seven statutes permit
a veto by a congressional committee alone. 122 CONG. REc. S6833 (daily ed. May 11, 1976).
Similar state legislative veto provisions have generally been upheld under state constitu-
tions. See, e.g., Watrons v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218 P.2d 498 (1950);
Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 266 A.2d 823 (1970); Opinion of the Justices, 96 N.H.
517, 83 A.2d 738 (1950); Moran v. LaGuardia, 270 N.Y. 450, 1 N.E.2d 961 (1936). The
constitutionality of the legislative veto has never been authoritatively decided by the federal
courts. The Supreme Court deliberately avoided the issue when it considered the Federal
Election Campaign Act in Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612, 692 n.176 (1976). Justice White,
in a separate opinion concurring and dissenting, expressed the view that the legislative veto
was constitutional, 96 S.Ct. at 757-58; see also 6 Op. ATT'y GEN. 680 (1854); 9 Op. Arr'Y GEN.
387 (1859); 19 Op. Arr'y GE. 385 (1889); 37 Op. ATr'y GEN. 56 (1933). Most commentators
seem to agree that the legislative veto, in the form it has thus far been used, does not violate
the constitutional allocation of powers between the legislative and executive branches.
Compare 122 CONG. REC. S6830 (1976) with Rehnquist, Committee Veto: Fifty Years of
Sparring between the Executive and the Legislature, Remarks before the Section of Adminis-
trative Law of the American Bar Association (Aug. 12, 1969); Ginnane, The Control of Federal
Administration by Congressional Resolutions & Committees, 66 HIAv. L. Rav. 569, 611 (1953)
(veto power rejected); Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 H~Av. L. REV. 1353 (1953);
Note, 13 HAuv. J. LEGis. 593 (1976); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional
Control of the Executive, 63 CALiF. L. REv. 983 (1975); Cooper and Cooper, The Legislative
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resolution57 for aid termination and making several other changes
not relevant to the human rights provision, Congress again enacted
the legislation and the President signed it on June 30, 1976.
Thus, each succeeding provision in 1973,11 1974,11 1975,0 and
197611 became more detailed and more directive than the preceding.
Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 467, 514 (1962); Boisvert, A Legislative
Tool for Supervision of Administrative Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REv.
638, 654 (1957) (congressional veto power sustained); Schwartz, Legislative Control of Admin-
istrative Rules and Regulations, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031 (1955); Newman and Keeton,
Congress and the Faithful Execution of the Laws - Should Legislators Supervise
Administrators? 41 CALIF. L. REv. 565 (1953); but see Note, 1976 DUKE L. J. 285 (1976).
11 6 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2187 (1976). By changing the concurrent resolution to a
joint resolution, Congress made it less likely that Congress would exercise a veto over aid
under section 502B, because the assent of both Houses and the President's signature are
required for making a joint resolution effective. United States ex rel. Levey v. Stockslager,
129 U.S. 470, 9 S.Ct. 382, 32 L.Ed. 785 (1889). Congress is already empowered to cut off aid
by concurrent resolution under 22 U.S.C.A. § 2367 (Supp. 1976). A concurrent resolution is
adopted by both houses of Congress, but need not be submitted to the President. Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). In addition, Congress could merely amend any appropriations
bill to change foreign aid to a particular country for human rights reasons. See text at notes
103-08 infra. Accordingly, the veto-engendered modification was more cosmetic than substan-
tive.
" 87 Stat. 714, 733, § 32 (1973).
" 88 Stat. 1795, 1815, § 46 (1974).
22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n(b) (Pamph. Supp. 1, 1976).
" 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304 (Pamph. Supp. I, Pt. 1, 1976). The full text of section 502B of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, states:
(a)(1) It is the policy of the United States, in accordance with its international
obligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with
the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States, to promote and
encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. To this end, a principal
goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to promote the increased observ-
ance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.
(2) It is further the policy of the United States that, except under circumstances
specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided to any country the
government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of interna-
tionally recognized human rights.
(3) In furtherance of the foregoing policy the President is directed to formulate
and conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a
manner which will promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of
the United States through such programs with governments which deny to their
people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in vio-
lation of international law or in contravention of the policy of the United States as
expressed in this section or otherwise.
(b) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress, as part of the presenta-
tion materials for security assistance programs proposed for each fiscal year, a full
and complete report, prepared with the assistance of the Coordinator for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect to practices regarding the observ-
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ance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights in each country
proposed as a recipient of security assistance. In determining whether a government
falls within the provisions of subsection (a)(3) of this section and in the preparation
of any report or statement required under this section, consideration shall be given
to -
(1) the relevant findings of appropriate international organizations, including
nongovernmental organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross; and
(2) the extent of cooperation by such government in permitting an unimpeded
investigation by any such organization of alleged violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights.
(c)(1) Upon the request of the Senate or the House of Representatives by resolu-
tion of either such House, or upon the request of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate or the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of State shall, within thirty days after receipt of
such request, transmit to both such committees a statement, prepared with the
assistance of the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with
respect to the country designated in such request, setting forth -
(A) all the available information about observance of and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedom in that country, and a detailed description of
practices by the recipient government with respect thereto:
(B) the steps the United States has taken to -
(i) promote respect for and observance of human rights in that country
and discourage any practices which are inimical to internationally recognized
human rights, and
(ii) publicly or privately call attention to, and disassociate the United
Stats and any security assistance provided for such country from, such practices;
(C) whether, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, notwithstanding any such
practices -
(i) extraordinary circumstances exist which necessitate a continuation of
secuity assistance for such country, and, if so, a description of such circumstances
and the extent to which such assistance should be continued (subject to such
conditions as Congress may impose under this section), and
(ii) on all the facts it is in the national interest of the United States to
provide such assistance; and
(D) such other information as such committee or such House may request.
(2)(A) A resolution of request under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be
considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
(B) The term "certification" as used in section 601 of such Act, means, for the
purposes of this subsection, a resolution of request of the Senate under paragraph
(1) of this subsection.
(3) In the event a statement with respect to a country is requested pursuant to
paragraph (1) of this subsection but is not transmitted in accordance therewith
within thirty days after receipt of such request, no security assistance shall be
delivered to such country except as may thereafter be specifically authorized by law
from such country unless and until such statement is transmitted.
(4)(A) In the event a statement with respect to a country is transmitted under
paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Congress may at any time thereafter adopt a
joint resolution terminating, restricting, or continuing security assistance for such
country. In the event such a joint resolution is adopted, such assistance shall be so
terminated, so restricted, or so continued, as the case may be.
(B) Any such resolution shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with
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This series culminated with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance
Act, which contained four major provisions. First, section
502B(a)(1) declared that "a principal goal of the foreign policy of
the United States is to promote the increased observance of interna-
tionally recognized human rights." 2
Second, section 502B(a)(3) instructs the President that military
aid programs must be formulated to promote human rights and
avoid identification of the United States with repressive regimes . 3
Third, section 502B(a)(2) provides for the termination or restriction
of security assistance "to any country which engages in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights."64
Finally, section 502B contains two very important reporting re-
quirements which compel the Administration to make "a full and
complete report" on the human rights situation in every country
receiving security assistance 5 and which permit the foreign rela-
tions committee of either House to demand further information on
human rights in aid-recipient countries.
the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976.
(C) The term "certification," as used in section 601 of such Act, means for the
purposes of this paragraph, a statement transmitted under paragraph (1) of this
subsection.
(d) For the purposes of this section -
(1) the term "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" in-
cludes torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged
detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant denial of the right to life,
liberty, or the security of person; and
(2) the term "security assistance" means -
(A) assistance under part II (military assistance) or part IV (security supporting
assistance) or part V (military education and training) of this subchapter or sub-
chapter V (assistance to the Middle East) of this chapter;
(B) sales of defense articles or services, extensions of credits (including partici-
pations in credits, and guaranties of loans under the Arms Export Control Act; or
(C) any license in effect with respect to the export of defense articles or defense
services to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security
forces of a foreign country under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act.
12 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(1).
0 Id. § 2304(a)(3).
" Id. § 2304(a)(2).
"Id. § 2304(b).
"Id. § 2304(c).
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A. The General Human Rights Policy Directive of Section 502B
The first and, perhaps, the most significant provision in the re-
vised section 502B does not deal specifically with military assis-
tance, but contains a direction for the entire conduct of United
States foreign policy:
It is the policy of the United States, in accordance with its interna-
tional obligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations
and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of
the United States to promote and encourage increased respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion. To this end, a principal
goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to promote the
increased observance of internationally recognized human rights
by all countries. 7
But what does it mean to make the "increased observance of
internationally recognized human rights" "a principal goal of the
foreign policy of the United States?" Section 502B(a)(1) refers to
the "international obligations" of the United States "as set forth in
the Charter of the United Nations" "to promote and encourage
increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 8 This
language derives verbatim from article 1 of the United Nations
Charter, establishing the purposes of the United Nations. Indeed,
under article 56 of the Charter the United States has an
"international obligation" "to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with" the United Nations to achieve "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 9
In other words, section 502B(a)(1) makes an understanding of the
principles and procedures of the United Nations indispensable to
the interpretation of domestic legislation and to the development of
domestic policies. Although section 502B establishes several bilat-
eral procedures for the achievement of human rights objectives
through reports to Congress and aid restrictions, the measure may
be more meaningful insofar as it redirects attention to international
norms and procedures.7 0
" Id. § 2304(a)(1).
I d.
" U.N. CHARTER, art. 55, § (c).
,0 As to the applicable international norms, see note 116 infra. As indicated at notes 94 and
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B. Formulation of Aid Programs to Promote Human Rights
Section 502B envisions an additional mechanism for human
rights implementation through the foreign aid process. Both sec-
tions 502B and 116 have received most attention because they au-
thorize the termination or reduction of economic and military aid
to "any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights."'" Section
502B(a)(3), however, may be just as important for its direction to
the President:
In furtherance of the foregoing policy, the President is directed to
formulate and conduct international security assistance programs
of the United States in a manner which will promote and advance
human rights and avoid identification of the United States,
through such programs with governments which deny to their peo-
ple internationally recognized human rights and fundamental free-
doms, in violation of international law or in contravention of the
policy of the United States as expressed in this section or other-
wise."
While subsection 502B(a)(1) makes increased observance of
human rights a general factor to be considered in formulating
United States foreign policy, subsection (3) refers more specifically
to the formulation and conduct of international security assistance
programs. Under subsection (3) the President is "directed to formu-
late and conduct international security assistance programs .
The use of the term "directed" suggests that subsection (3) is to be
taken as more than advisory, but the direction is not very specific.
The President is only ordered to take positive action to restructure
the security assistance programs in furtherance of human rights.
While subsection (2) requires evidence of "gross violations" and a
"consistent pattern" before the termination of aid, subsection (3)
simply directs the President to take action to avoid United States
association with governments which deny to their people interna-
tionally recognized human rights. This language is far less specific
than that of subsection (2) as to what situations might justify
United States response.
126 infra, some of the language in section 502B derives quite explicitly from international
procedures.
71 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(2), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n(b); E. Snyder, Background Paper on U.S.
Human Rights Legislation (unpublished memorandum 1976).
" 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(3).
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Section 116 contains no similar provision as to the formulation of
economic assistance in a manner which will promote human rights.73
Nevertheless, in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the Congress
from enacting the more severe aid termination provision of section
116, the Agency for International Development began to consider
how human rights factors ought to influence the structure of the
United States aid program.7" Even though the Congress was not
sufficiently impressed to discard the more coercive aid termination
measure of section 116, the Agency for International Development
has continued to consider how to inject the human rights element
into United States development assistance.75 The proviso of section
116 that aid may, despite human rights violations, continue to
"needy people" obliquely suggests such an inquiry.7" Also, the gen-
eral human rights mandate of section 502B(a)(1) requires that
human rights be considered as a principal factor in all foreign policy
decisions, including economic assistance. Accordingly, there is con-
siderable justification for considering the human rights implications
of foreign aid.
Certainly, both military and economic assistance have a human
rights dimension. If the United States provides training or weapons
to foreign military and police personnel, the United States may well
assist the repression of political dissent in aid-recipient countries."
Indeed, there has been some evidence of direct complicity in foreign
anti-insurgency activities, which have resulted in torture, political
71 Id. § 2151n.
7' See Chile: The Status of Human Rights and Its Relationship to U.S. Economic Assis-
tance Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House
Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1976).
,1 See, e.g., Agency for International Development, Human Rights and Economic Develop-
ment: Civic Participation Notes (unpublished memorandum 1976).
71 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n(b). See also 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2151, 2161 (1964); §§ 2167, 2168, 2171
(Supp. 1977).
" See generally Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 § 30, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2420 (Supp. 1976). The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee recognized that:
United States participation in the highly sensitive area of public safety and police
training unavoidably invites criticism from persons who seek to identify the United
States with every act of local police brutality or oppression in any country in which
this program operates. It matters little whether the charges can be substantiated,
they inevitably stigmatize the total United States foreign aid effort.
S. REP. No. 1299, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6705, 6706-07. See also REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES: STOPPING U.S. ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN POLCE AND PRISONS, Doc. No. B-170474 (Feb.
19, 1976); Klare & Stein, Exporting the Tools of Repression, NATION, Oct. 16, 1976, at 365.
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imprisonment, and other forms of political oppression.7" United
States training programs for foreign military officers are numerous
but have thus far evaded substantial human rights scrutiny.79 Since
military officers in many countries perform police functions and also
engage in political repression, section 502B(a)(3) requires far greater
attention as to how military training and weapons assistance pro-
grams are affecting human rights in recipient countries. In fact,
while the State Department has begun to pay some heed to the
mandate of section 502B, it is not at all clear that word of section
502B has reached the Defense Department. When the United States
provides weapons, it should attempt to assure that the weapons are
of a kind not useful or used for torture or internal political repres-
sion. If section 502B(a)(3) is taken seriously, many weapons may
thus not be sold or given if unrelated to external defense.
Similarly, the Treasury Department maintains a program for the
training of foreign police under the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion."o There is evidence of torture and human rights abuses in the
foreign sector of these Treasury activities.8' In all these training
programs the Administration should assure not only that torture is
not being taught, but also that positive human rights education is
provided.
As with military aid, the United States has long ignored the
human rights impact of its economic development programs. When
certain sectors of a foreign economy are fostered, related political
sectors are encouraged.82 Economic development is not politically
neutral. Indeed, economic aid may create more wealth in the ag-
gregate, but may aggravate economic and political injustice. Cer-
" See, e.g., U.S. Official Expresses 'Regrets' for Role in Chile but is Disavowed, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 4; see generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE,
79-105 (Case Study of Torture in Greece) (1975); cf. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING
FOREIGN LEADERS, S. Doc. No. 94-465, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
" Klare & Stein, Exporting the Tools of Repression, NATION, Oct. 16, 1976, at 365, 366.
" The prohibition against the use of foreign assistance funds for training foreign police
contained in § 30 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, (see note 77 supra) is not applicable
to narcotics training by the Drug Enforcement Administration. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2420(b) (Supp.
1976).
s See, e.g., United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); see generally
Note, 11 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 137 (1976).
82 See, e.g., AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 16 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as AID 1976 REPORT.].
1 See generally id..
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tainly some of the most "successful" development programs of such
countries as Brazil, Iran, and Indonesia have apparently been ac-
companied by both greater economic inequality and repression.8 4
Accordingly, section 502B(a)(1) may require the United States to
reconsider some of the basic assumptions underlying the economic
aid programs of this country.
Not only should economic development programs take account of
the human rights dimension, but section 502B might also suggest
that some aid should be focused at resolving the human rights prob-
lems in a more direct way. For example, the United States Ambas-
sador to Indonesia has apparently become involved in the recent
efforts of that government to release some of the between 27,000 and
55,000 political prisoners who have been incarcerated in Indonesia
for as long as twelve years. The Indonesian government faces tre-
mendous logistical problems in just moving, much less reintroduc-
ing, these prisoners into their former communities. The United
States government might financially assist and thus facilitate the
release and reintegration process.
Similarly, the United States might provide financial assistance
indirectly through the United Nations86 or through such organiza-
tions as the Inter-American Foundation, the Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law (Africa Assistance Project), the World
Council of Churches, and the International Defense and Aid Fund,
which in turn provide defense lawyers to political detainees and
much needed aid to the families of prisoners." These limited exam-
ples of human rights-directed aid only begin to demonstrate how
United States financial assistance might be used to support initia-
tives for the settlement of human rights problems.
, Cf. Torture and Oppression in Brazil, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF TORTUE IN BRAzEL (2d ed. 1974);
Human Rights in Indonesia and the Philippines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations), 94th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. (1976); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BRIEFING: IRAN (Nov. 1976); see also Manglapus,
Dictators and Myths, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1977, §A, at 12, col. 1.
91 See Weissbrodt, The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Imple-
mentation of Human Rights, 12 TEX. INT'L L. J. 293, 293 n.1 (1977).
N E.g., U.S. Mission to United Nations, United States Pledges $50,000 for United Nations
Training Program in Namibia, Press Release USUN - 14 (77), Mar. 21, 1977.
81 See Weissbrodt, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 4, 1977) (unpublished statement).
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C. Limiting Aid
The potential impact of a human rights directed aid-restructuring
may be far greater than the result of the aid-termination provisions
of sections 116 and 502B. s After all, many Third World countries
may see section 502B and particularly section 116 as merely another
excuse for the United States to refuse needed assistance.89 These two
provisions may also be construed as attempts by the United States
to impose particular institutional structures on aid recipient coun-
tries. For these reasons, aid giving may, in fact, be more effective
and less resented than aid restrictions.90
Nevertheless, the aid termination provisions of both sections 502B
and 116 are important as potentially more coercive means of imple-
menting human rights and insofar as they suggest a methodology for
the whole United States human rights program. Sections 116 and
502B carry very similar aid cut-off language. Section 116, of course,
applies to economic assistance and states:
No assistance may be provided under this part to the government
of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights, including torture
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, pro-
longed detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the
See Jackson, Foreign Aid: Strategy or Stopgap?, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 90, 101 (1962).
0 Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay have stated their intention to
refuse further United States aid, because of the Carter human rights campaign. Oberdorfer,
Banks, Not U.S. Now Give Brazil Its Foreign Aid, Wash. Post. Mar. 20, 1977, §A, at 1, col.
6. Although Brazil explained its action initially as a result of the forthright report on human
rights in Brazil issued by the State Department under section 502B of the Foreign Assistance
Act, the Brazilian action may also have been motivated by displeasure at United States
efforts to stop the transfer of plutonium technology to Brazil. Oberdorfer, State Dept. Lists
Rights in 82 Countries, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1977, §A, at 1, col. 2. It may well be that the
amounts of United States aid have so diminished as to make aid termination measures
symbolic gestures.
" Certainly, the Hickenlooper Amendment limiting economic aid to countries which expro-
priate United States owned property did not succeed in its stated purpose and has been
largely ignored in recent years. See R. LILUCH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 141-
45 (1965); Eder, Expropriation: Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4 INT'L LAW. 611, 627 (1970);
Furnish, Eder's Hickenlooper: Some Clarifications Regarding Peru and Other Matters, 5 INT'L
LAW. 348, 352-53 (1971); Note, Argentina and the Hickenlooper Amendment, 54 CAuF. L. REv.
2078, 2079 (1966); Brown, The Use of Foreign Aid as an Instrument to Secure Compliance
with International Obligations, 58 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 210, 211-14 (1964); Olmstead,
Foreign Aid as an Effective Means of Persuasion, 58 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 205, 208-10
(1964).
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right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assis-
tance will directly benefit the needy people in such country."
Section 502B applies to all "security assistance" including mili-
tary aid, military training, sales of defense implements or services,
the extension of credit or loans for the purchase of weapons, and any
license for the export of defense articles or services:
It is further the policy of the United States that, except under
circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may
be provided to any country the government of which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights."
Both provisions require an understanding of three requirements:
that the government "engage in" 3 human rights violations, that
there be a "consistent pattern" '94 of violations, and that the viola-
22U.S.C.A. § 2151n(a).
I ld. § 2304(a)(2).
3 See generally Agency for International Development, Legal Interpretation - Section 116
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: Human Rights Amendment in Chile: The Status of
Human Rights and Its Relationship to U.S. Economic Assistance Program: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1976) [hereinafter cited as AID Opinion].
" The "gross" and "consistent" language of sections 502B and 116 appear to derive from a
number of United Nations resolutions. The first U.N. reference to a "consistent pattern" and
"gross violations" of human rights apparently occurred in resolution 8 of the Commission on
Human Rights passed in 1967. Resolution 8 requested the Economic and Social Council to
authorize the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to study and investigate "situations which reveal
a consistent pattern of violations of human rights," and "to report with recommendations
thereon to the Economic and Social Council." 42 ECOSOC Supp. No. 6, E/4322, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/940 at 131 (1967). For a discussion of the background of this resolution, see Ermacora,
Procedure to Deal with Human Rights Violations: A Hopeful Start in the United Nations, 7
HUMAN RIGHTS J. 670, 678 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Ermacora].
At its 42d session in June 1967, ECOSOC took positive action on the Commission's recom-
mendation under resolution 1235 which authorized the Commission and Subcommission "to
examine the information relevant to gross violations of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, as exemplified by the policy of Apartheid .... " 42 ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 17, U.N.
Doc. E/4393 (1967). ECOSOC adopted a second resolution, 1503, establishing further proce-
dures to be used in dealing with individual communications concerning human rights viola-
tions. Operative paragraph 5 of resolution 1503 allows the Subcommission to refer to the
Commission "particular situations which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and
reliably attested violations of human rights . 48 ECOSOC Supp. 1A, at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/4835/Add. 1 (1970).
As Professor Ermacora has observed, the wording of resolution 1503 is more cautious than
that of resolution 1235: "ECOSOC resolution 1503 (XLVIII) speaks about 'particular situa-
tions which appear to reveal' (instead of "situations which reveal") a consistent pattern of
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tions be "gross." 5 Each term addresses to some extent the circum-
gross and reliably attested (instead of "gross violations") violations as exemplified by .. "
Ermacora, supra at 678. The rest of the language in the two resolutions is essentially the same.
Despite the similarity in the language of sections 502B and 116 to that of ECOSOC resolutions
1235 and 1503, the relative scarcity of information concerning the history of the U.N. "gross"
and "consistent" language limits the utility of these documents as a definitional source for
sections 502B and 116. Nevertheless, there is a need for more inquiry into concrete applica-
tions and elaborations of 1235, 1503, and similar provisions by U.N. bodies, in so far as they
may shed light on the meaning of sections 502B and 116.
Looking at the legislative history of section 502B and its companion language in section
116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, there is also little to suggest how the phrase "consistent
pattern" should be construed. At a minimum, however, the use of this language would seem
to suggest that a single incident will not be enough to establish governmental responsibility
within the meaning of either provision. Ermacora, supra at 678. Instead, the violations must
recur often enough to be identified as a distinct course of action. Along these lines, Professor
Ermacora suggests that the expression "consistent pattern" as it appears in ECOSOC resolu-
tions 1235 and 1503, indicates a time element in the operative language. Id. In other words,
the violation must be one with a certain continuity whose end cannot be foreseen.
A different interpretation of the significance of the phrase "consistent pattern" is provided
by the Agency for International Development of the State Department which perceives this
language as evidence of a congressional intent that governmental responsibility for the abuses
be established before sections 502B and 116 will apply. AID Opinion, supra note 93, at 107
n.1. Hence, the Agency for International Development's Office of General Counsel construed
section 116: "A finding that a consistent pattern exists would tend to refute assertions by the
country concerned that violations which occurred were the acts of unauthorized officials and
at variance with official policy." Id. The need to establish a linkage between the government
and the human rights violations for purposes of sections 502B and 116 is emphasized as well
by the use of the phrase "engaged in." The State Department's interpretation seems to
suggest, however, that where a "consistent pattern" of human rights abuses occurs, govern-
ment responsibility will be inferred. Id. In other words, it is enough to establish governmental
involvement that the government knows of the violations and does nothing to stop them.
11 Under sections 502B and 116 not only must there be a "consistent pattern" of human
rights violations but these violations must be "gross." Indicative of the kinds of abuses that
constitute "gross violations" is the list of enumerated abuses contained in sections 502B and
116 themselves. Accordingly, "torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment; prolonged detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant denials of the right
to life, liberty, or the security of person" clearly fall within the parameters of sections 502B
and 116. The State Department has suggested that guidance as to what constitutes gross
violations might also be found in "widely accepted statements and sources of international
law." Id. By way of illustration, the State Department notes the "grave breaches" identified
by the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 1949:
Grave breaches to which the preceeding article relates shall be those involving any
of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the
present Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment including biologi-
cal experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person,
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial . . ..
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3517, 3618, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
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stances in which a government might justifiably be held responsible
for human rights violations. Each also raises difficult definitional
problems."
Although sections 502B and 116 were never applied during the
previous Administration, similar legislative language prompted the
United States Director to the Inter-American Development Bank to
vote against a $21 million loan to Chile in 1976Y7 The United States
vote against the loan was cast pursuant to a 1976 law which specifi-
cally instructs the United States Director of the Inter-American
Bank to oppose loans or extensions of financial assistance "to any
country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.""8 Hence, in the case of
The legislative history of section 502B indicates that its restriction to cases involving "gross
violations" reflects a congressional consensus that some human rights violations are more
serious than others and that these must be addressed first. The House expressly rejected an
amendment to the 1974 version of section 502B by Representative Gross which would, in its
sponsor's words, have barred security assistance to any nation guilty of "the denial of human
rights under any circumstances," 120 CONG. REc. H11,598 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1974). In oppos-
ing this amendment, the bill's chief House sponsor Representative Donald Fraser expressed
concern that such language "reaches too broadly and suggests that all countries have got to
make good on everything all at once in order that we may continue to provide assistance."
120 CONG. REc. H11,597 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1974). Fraser went on to explain that enforcement
under the proposed legislation was to be directed not at violations of all human rights but at
violations of "the most fundamental of all human rights, the right to the integrity of one's
person." Id. The rationale for the restricted focus of the committee bill was apparently a
concern that to overreach in terms of the rights covered would make the Act both unenforce-
able and ineffective. Id.
" The interpretation of this human rights legislation presents different problems of con-
struction than usually faced by courts in construing statutes. Here it is not likely that a court
will have an opportunity ever to construe this legislation. Instead, the statute is intended to
regulate the relations between Congress and the Administration, probably without judicial
intervention. Accordingly, the statute is applied and interpreted in the light of conflicts
between Congress and the Administration. The bargains struck and accommodations reached
constitute the most authoritative source of interpretation-aside from the statutory language.
Of course, courts defer to some extent to the interpretation given a statute by the adminis-
tering agency. Compare Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837, 838 (1975), and
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974) (if consistent with congressional purpose) with
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973); and Columbia Braodcasting
System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973) (unless compelling indications
agency interpretation is wrong). But in this human rights legislation it might be said that
both the State Department and Congress are given administrative responsibility so that the
State Department's view may be entitled to less weight than courts might give with another
kind of statute.
" See note 52 supra.
"9 22 U.S.C.A. § 283y (Pamph. Supp. II, Pt. 1, 1976). Section 211 of the same law (Pub.
L. No. 94-302) directs the United States Executive Director of the African Development Fund
to vote against any loan or extension of financial or technical assistance "to any country which
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Chile, the United States has formally recognized the existence of
conditions falling within the parameters of this prohibition. In vot-
ing against the loan to Chile, the United States representative did
not explain what facts prompted the decision, although he did cite
the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission
report on human rights violations in Chile." The Chile vote may
begin to establish a benchmark for what constitutes a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.
By February 1977 the Carter Administration indicated its inten-
tion to limit military aid to Argentina, Uruguay, and Ethiopia on
human rights grounds pursuant to section 502B. 100 In making these
announcements, the State Department again did not explain the
factual basis for the decision. 0' The Human Rights Reports submit-
ted to Congress in March 1977 pursuant to section 502B(b) dis-
cussed the human rights situation in those three countries among
the 82 nations mentioned. 02 But the 1977 Human Rights Reports
failed to indicate facts which demonstrated the basis for a determi-
nation that those three countries were engaging in a "consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights."
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights." 22 U.S.C.A. § 290g-9 (Pamph. Supp. H, Pt. 1, 1976). See generally The African
Development Fund, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Development Institu-
tions and Finance of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975). See also note 52 supra.
" See INT R-AMEmcAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF HUMAN
RIoHTS IN CHILE, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. L/VII.34, Doc. 21 (1974); Chile: The Status of Human
Rights and Its Relationship to US. Economic Assistance Programs, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-78 (1976) (testimony of Jose Zalaquett, defense attorney for political
prisoners, Vicariate of Solidarity, Roman Catholic Church, Chile); see also Human Rights in
Chile: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organization and Movements and on
Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Pts. 1 &
2 (1974). See Protection of Human Rights in Chile, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, U.N. Doc. A/10285 (1975).
' See note 156 infra.
101 Id.
102 1977 HUMAN RIGHTS REPoRTs, note 111 infra at 106-08, 141-43, 89-90. As to Argentina
see 122 CONG. Rac. E3780 (daily ed. July 2, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan). Argentina's
failure to cooperate with inquiries about the arrest of United States citizens may have con-
tributed to the decision. de Onis, Argentina Beset by Arrest/Queries, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,
1976, at 5, col. 1.
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In any case, it is quite doubtful that Congress would ever pursue
the cumbersome aid termination process outlined in section 502B or
even the less arduous concurrent resolution process prescribed by
section 116. Instead of starting anew with time-consuming resolu-
tions, Congress may take note of the information produced as a
result of the section 502B reporting procedures, oversight hearings,
and other human rights information, and then short-circuit the sec-
tion 502B or 116 aid termination process by a simple motion in
committee or on the floor of either House to amend the aid appropri-
ation for particular countries.
Indeed, on several occasions before and since the passage of sec-
tions 116 and 502B, members of Congress have used this parallel
approach to limit or terminate aid, on human rights grounds. For
example, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 limited the amount of
security assistance available to South Korea because of its poor
human rights record. °3 In the same year Congress limited economic
assistance for Chile to $25 million and purported to terminate mili-
tary assistance altogether."' The following year the economic aid
ceiling for Chile was raised to $90 million.'"5 After receiving evidence
that the Administration had frustrated the congressional aid limita-
tions for Chile, Congress again limited economic aid to $27,500,000
and removed some of the means by which the Administration cir-
cumvented the limitations.' For example, instead of allowing mili-
tary aid appropriated under previous years to be delivered, Congress
was much more explicit:
103 Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, § 26, 88 Stat. 1802. In fiscal year 1974, grants and credit
sales to South Korea totalled $178.6 million while the administration's 1975 request was
nearly $253 million. The fiscal 1975 military assistance limitation was placed on South Korea
because of "serious concern about the increasingly repressive measures of the South Korea
Government." S. REP. No. 1299, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974], 4 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6703.
I" Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, § 25, 88 Stat. 1802. The limitation on military assistance
to Chile expressed Congressional concern about the "continuing disregard" for human rights
in that country. The executive branch had requested a total Chile aid package of $84.9
million, of which $21.3 million was earmarked for military assistance and credit sales. S. REP.
No. 1299, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974]. 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6705.
1*1 International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 § 320, 89 Stat. 849 [1975].
too § 406(b)(1) of Pub. L. No. 94-329, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 note (Pamph. Supp. III, Pt. 1,
1976). The President was given the authority under the Act to increase the limit by
$27,500,000 if he certified that Chile no longer was engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations, that it had permitted an unimpeded investigation into alleged violations, and that
it had taken steps to inform the families of prisoners of charges against them and of their
condition. Id. § 406(b)(2).
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No military or security supporting assistance and no military edu-
cation and training may be furnished under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 for Chile . . . . No deliveries of any such assistance,
credits, or guarantees may be made to Chile on or after the date
of enactment of this Section.07
Rather than use the "consistent pattern of gross violations" stan-
dard or the joint resolution approach of section 502B, Representa-
tive Koch moved during mid-1976 in the Foreign Operations Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Appropriations to cut off all
of the $3 million in military aid to Uruguay. Representative Koch
explained his action on human rights grounds.0 8 The State Depart-
ment apparently lobbied with members of the House to have the
Uruguayan aid continued, arguing that the Congress should instead
use the newly enacted joint resolution procedure and "consistent
pattern of gross violations" standard of section 502B. Nevertheless,
the State Department argument failed to prevent passage of a
Uruguay military aid termination provision.
These aid termination actions by Congress appear to be so quix-
otic and unrelated to the more carefully patterned response envi-
sioned by section 502B that they draw into question the ability of
Congress to contribute responsibly to the promotion of human
rights. In fact, these aid terminations seem to have been motivated
by Congress' desire to "do something - anything" about human
rights and by anger at the State Department's refusal to take less
coercive measures.'09 Also, individual members of Congress might be
motivated by such extraneous factors as the need for publicity and
the desire to take a relatively easy shot at an available target - the
State Department or a small country. Since Congress clearly has the
constitutional spending power to take these actions, the only limit
must come from congressional self-restraint. Perhaps, as the State
Department builds its credibility in carrying out the general con-
gressional mandate in section 502B(a)(1) to promote human rights,
the Congress will not need to intervene so bluntly in the process.
10 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (Pamph. Supp. III, Pt. 1, 1976).
' See 122 CONG. REc. S16406 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976); Diuguid, Congress Cuts Uruguay
Aid; Rights Violations Are Cited, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1976, §A, at 8, col. 1; see also
Uruguay's Military Leaders Angry Over Congressional Cutoff on Aid For Arms, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 5, 1976, at 13, col. 1; 122 CONG. REc. S4481 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1976) (remarks of Rep.
Koch).
10 See 121 CONG. REc. S21276 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1975) (statement of Senator Cranston).
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D. Investigatory and Reporting Provisions of Section 502B
Section 502B establishes two legislative procedures requiring the
State Department to make public declarations about human rights
situations in an aid-giving context. Section 502B(b) requires a "full
and complete report . . . with respect to practices regarding the
observance of and respect for internationally recognized human
rights in each country proposed as a recipient of security assis-
tance.""10 This "full and complete report" must be transmitted to
the Congress as part of the presentation materials for security assis-
tance programs proposed for each fiscal year."' Although section
, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(b).
The State Department sent the first Human Rights Reports to Congress under section
502B(b) in early March 1977 and the Reports were made available to the public on March
18. The reports were largely prepared in December 1976 under the previous Administration.
The documents were apparently re-formatted and changed slightly during late January and
February to reflect the new Administration's views. But there was no time for gathering new
information or even thorough redrafting. Accordingly, the reports largely reflect the attitudes
of the previous Administration. 1977 HuMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, PREPARED By THE DEPARTz Er
OF STATE, SuBMIrrED O THE SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 HuMAN RIOlrs REPORTS].
Furthermore the first "full and complete report" may have been formulated and published
independent of the security assistance request and may not have been the subject of serious
consideration when the requested aid levels were proposed by the State Department. Such a
procedure would, of course, violate the purposes of section 502B and particularly subsection
502B(a)(3), which states that the
President is directed to formulate and conduct international security assistance
programs of the United States in a manner which will promote and advance human
rights and avoid indentification of the United States, through such programs, with
governments which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights
and fundamental freedoms, in violation of international law or in contravention of
the policy of the United States as expressed in this Section or otherwise.
The Administration was not required to report on human rights practices in all countries,
but only those proposed as a recipient of security assistance, that is, military aid, training,
loans for weapons, weapons sales, and any export licenses. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(b),
(c)(4)(D)(2)(C). Export licenses for defense articles or services were issued during fiscal year
1976 for 139 countries but the State Department only produced reports for 82 countries. The
State Department apparently decided without explanation to exclude countries receiving
only arms sales. The State Department may have reasoned that a country purchasing arms
was not "proposed as a recipient of security assistance." Such a limited reading of section
502B(b) appears rather begrudging, if not incorrect.
Also, the State Department decided not to give information on any country, e.g., Chile,
South Africa, and the Soviet Union, not receiving any such assistance. In other words, the
State Department apparently chose not to issue a more evenhanded report on human rights
in the world. The Department purported to give the Congress only what section 502B required
or less. Unlike some of the initiatives of the same period, the Human Rights Reports did not
constitute a new part of the human rights campaign of the Carter administration. Neverthe-
less, the reports were received by the media and other countries as part of the Carter human
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502B(b) requires a "full and complete report," the section does not
specify the contents of the report in any of the detail required by
section 502B(c) for reports requested specifically by either House or
rights campaign. See, e.g., Angry Brazil Cancels Pact with U.S., Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1977,
§A, at 1, col. 4.
It is very difficult to characterize the context of the 82 reports in general terms because of
their diverse authorship and approaches. Nevertheless, there are affirmative aspects of the
document: (1) The State Department collected its own information about human rights issues
and in several countries actually contributed to the fund of published knowledge (e.g., Ca-
meroon, Sudan, and Afghanistan); (2) The State Department information was sufficiently
detailed in a few countries to present important comments on human rights situations (e.g.,
Philippines, Korea, Brazil, and Israel). There are also problems inherent in the document:
(1) Most of the reports are vague, extremely general, and "tactfully drafted" to protect the
countries discussed (e.g., Gabon, Ethiopia, and Argentina; see Breslin, Human Rights: Rhet-
oric or Action? Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1977, §C, at 1, col. 5); and (2) the reports ignore available
human rights information and stress historical, structural, and formally legalistic description
- rather than discussing the human rights "practices" required by section 502B(b) (e.g.,
Tunisia, Norway, Zaire, Uruguay, and Paraguay).
Each of the 82 reports devotes a section to "Other human rights reporting." In the previous
six country report of December 31, 1976, the State Department mentioned Amnesty Interna-
tional and other NGOs in the text, particularly when the State Department wanted to express
some uncomplimentary information without taking State Department responsibility. Accord-
ingly, the separate section for NGO material is an improvement in format. The State Depart-
ment took responsibility for at least some of the uncomplimentary information in the 1977
reports.
It will be remembered that section 502B(b) requires consideration to the relevant
"findings" of international organizations and the "extent of cooperation" given those organi-
zations. The State Department consistently reported upon the "findings" of only one interna-
tional organization - Amnesty International. Amnesty International (AI) is mentioned in
regard to 67 countries. Freedom House, which publishes an extremely summary, comparative
index of "human freedom," is also mentioned frequently.
The State Department did not consider in any systematic way the cooperation given to the
international organizations. Cooperation was mentioned in a few cases, for example, Haiti
(the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights), India (AI), Iran (International Commis-
sion of Jurists) (ICJ), Honduras (AI), the Dominican Republic (AI), Bolivia (the International
Committee of the Red Cross) (ICRC), and Brazil (ICRC). For example, the report on Brazil
leaves the impression that Brazil has cooperated with the ICRC, while omitting to mention
the refusal of Brazil to cooperate with all other international human rights organizations,
including the O.A.S. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the ICJ and Amnesty
International. The State Department did not systematically consider the findings of such
international organizations as the ICRC, the International Commission of Jurists, the Inter-
national League for Human Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights, and the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The State Department did not even consider the find-
ings of such international human rights organizations as the Minority Rights Group, Survival
International, the Anti-Slavery Society, the Committee for Indigenous Populations, the Anti-
Apartheid Movement, the International Federation for Human Rights, the Women's Interna-
tional League for Peace and Freedom, the Commission of the Churches for International
Affairs, the Pontifical Commission Justice and Peace, the International Labor Organization,
the International Press Institute, P.E.N., and Writers and Scholars International.
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their respective committees on foreign relations."'
Under section 502B(c)(1), the Senate, the House of Representa-
tives, or their respective foreign relations committees may request
the Secretary of State to transmit within 30 days a human rights
report as to any designated country. If the State Department fails
to respond to the request for a report within 30 days, section
502B(c) (3) suspends military assistance, until the report is delivered
or Congress expressly permits continuing aid.
By making a request for such a mandatory report under section
502B(c) or by requiring "a full and complete report" on all aid
recipient countries under section 502B(b), Congress risked upsetting
delicate diplomatic negotiations on particular human rights situa-
tions."3 But section 502B was drafted at a time when there was a
grave doubt as to whether serious diplomatic initiatives were being
undertaken by the Administration on human rights questions. Con-
gress may well have reasoned that it would be better to risk some
improperly timed statements than to persevere with the then-
prevailing inattention or inaction.
Under section 502B(c)(1)(A) the State Department is required to
set forth "all the available information about observance of and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" in the country
designated by the Congress and a "detailed description of practices
by the recipient government with respect thereto.""' Obviously, this
provision was intended to force the State Department to use its
considerable information gathering facilities to inform the Congress
and the American people"5 about observance of and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms in each country. In requir-
ing the State Department to set forth "all available information"
on "observance of" "human rights and fundamental freedoms," sec-
tion 502B(c) (1) (A) demands a thorough review of all practices under
the International Bill of Human Rights"6 - not merely a report on
1' 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(b).
" See, e.g., text at notes 173-79 infra.
.' 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(c)(1)(A).
"I The State Department initially indicated that the reports to Congress mandated by
502B(c) were to be classified when the first reports arrived on Capital Hill. Congressman
Fraser insisted that the information contained therein be declassified. The State Department
responded by excising certain material but ultimately acceded to congressional pressure and
in December 1976, the reports were made public. 1976 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, infra note
118, at III, V. Some parts of the State Department reply remained classified. Id. at 35 n.1.
"' It appears that the potential universe of "internationally recognized human rights" or
"human rights and fundamental freedom" is, indeed, expansive-including, but not limited
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to, international treaties, declarations, resolutions and executive agreements, as well as mul-
tilateral or regional conventions and declarations. While documents from any one of these
categories might be considered in specific situations, considerations of administrative conven-
ience would seem to dictate a tentative narrowing of the list of references which those charged
with administering section 502B must consult. Effective enforcement of 502B demands, at
the outset, that those carrying out its mandate reach a consensus as to what constitutes
"internationally recognized human rights."
Among international human rights instruments, the International Bill of Human Rights is
probably at once the most widely recognized and readily accessible of documents. The Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights is comprised of four documents:
(a) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. 810, at 56
(1948);
(b) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976;
(c) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967); and
(d) The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. See Sohn, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8
J. INT'L COMP. JUR. 17 (1967); E. SCRWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
(1964); CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 12-19 (1970); Newman,
Interpreting the Human Rights Clauses of the U.N. Charter, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 283, 285 n.7
(1972); Statement by Carlos Romulo, U.N. Secretariat, International Year for Human Rights
Newsletter, No. 8, Supp. 1, at 29, 30 (1969); Humphrey, The International Law of Human
Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw AND
OTHER ESSAYS 75, 85 (M. Bos. ed. 1973); E. LUARD, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 53 (1967). See, e.g., T. BUERGENTHAL & J. TORNEY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION 163 (1976); HUMAN RIGHTS, A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL IN-
STRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1, at 1-17 (1973); AMERICAN ASS'N FOR
THE INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (undated 1976); cf.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SELECTED DECLARATIONS AND AGREEMENTS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
Because the Covenants are more specific in delineating rights than the Universal Declara-
tion and because the Covenants contain much better defined derogation clauses, reference
to the full International Bill of Human Rights is preferable. E.g., compare art. 9 of the
Universal Declaration with art. 9 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; arts. 10 and
11 of the Universal Declaration with art. 14 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
and art. 23 of the Universal Declaration with art. 7 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. Compare also art. 29(2) of the Universal Declaration with arts. 4, 8(1)(a)
and 25 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and arts. 4, 12(3), 13, 14,
18(3), 19(3), 21, 22(2) and 47 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. But cf. REPORT
OF THE STUDY MISSION TO EUROPE TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1977).
In the interests of effective administration, it might be advisable-at least initially-to
confine the rights considered for purposes of section 502B to those set forth in the four
documents comprising the International Bill of Human Rights. Reference to the International
Bill of Human Rights also could not easily be assailed as a United States-centric rather than
an "internationally recognized" set of principles.
Since it is difficult to imagine a human right which does not arguably fall within the
spectrum of rights covered by the Universal Declaration and the two Covenants, little would
be lost by this restriction on sources of rights. Moreover, if a right were later to be identified
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human rights violations nor only a report on the activities of the aid
recipient government.
When Congress in fall 1976 first invoked this reporting require-
ment, it is clear that the State Department did not supply "all
available information" including its own human rights material and
data from other sources. Several times between 1974 and 1976 the
Department had requested substantial human rights studies from
all United States embassies abroad, "7 but the result of these surveys
are not very evident in the reports received by Congress. Instead,
when the report expressed derogatory human rights information, the
Department usually quoted Amnesty International, the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists, or testimony before the Subcommittee
on International Organizations." 8 Indeed, the Department is re-
quired by section 502B(b)(1) and (2) to give consideration to:
(1) The relevant findings of appropriate international organiza-
tions, including nongovernmental organizations, such as the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross; and
(2) The extent of cooperation by such government in permitting
an unimpeded investigation by any such organization of alleged
violations of internationally recognized human rights."9
The Department's report is extremely selective in noting the find-
ings of international organizations and attempts generally to disas-
sociate the Department from such information without confronting
the data on any factual basis. Also, the 1976 report failed to explain
the record of several governments in cooperating with major inter-
national organizations, except where the information was compli-
mentary to the aid recipients. For example, the State Department
did not indicate that Haiti has not cooperated with some Organiza-
which did not fall within the parameters of the International Bill of Rights, there is nothing
in the language or legislative history of 502B to preclude those charged with its enforcement
from expanding the list of documents identifying "internationally recognized human rights."
However, for the present, the International Bill provides the most convenient reference for
implementing section 502B.
1"' See, e.g., 1975 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 35, at app. 2 (Cable of Jan. 17,
1975, to all diplomatic posts); see id. at app. 5-6 (airgram of Feb. 14, 1975).
" HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. Poucy: ARGENTINA, HAITI, INDONESIA, IRAN, PERU AND THE PHIUP-
PINES, REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, 8-9, 14, 20, 24, 29-30 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 STATE
DEPARTMENr REPORT]. For a criticism of the accuracy of these reports, see Americans for
Democratic Action et. al., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Jan. 14, 1977) (unpub-
lished memorandum).
"1 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(b)(1)-(2).
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tion of American States human rights inquiries. 2 While the report
states that Iran cooperated with an International Commission of
Jurists mission in 1975,121 the report does not indicate that Iran has
refused all Amnesty International requests for the admission of ob-
servers to trials since 1972.122
The 1976 report frustrates the congressional desire for the State
Department to make a real contribution to the available informa-
tion on human rights problems, to the fact-finding necessary for
responsible congressional decision-making as to aid levels, and to
forthright United States government statements about human
rights situations. Instead, the Department's report so uncritically
relies on the information evidently provided by the aid recipient
governments23 that the reports may serve perversely to identify the
United States further with the human rights violators, rather than
to disassociate the United States government from these lamentable
practices. In any case, the congressional purpose as to public state-
ments about human rights practices was not served by the 1976
report.
Furthermore, in its 1976 report to Congress the State Department
expressly focused on only a few sections of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights 24 : article 3 (right to life, liberty, and security of
person), 5 (torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or pun-
ishment), 8 (effective legal redress for human rights violations in
domestic tribunals), 9 (arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile), 10 (fair
hearing), and 11 (presumption of innocence, public trial, and double
jeopardy). In addition to the very brief State Department comments
on the observance of these six articles in aid-recipient countries, the
reports contain even more summary references to "other freedoms,"
which include miscellaneous statements on such rights as the free-
dom of movement, political asylum, freedom of speech and press,
freedom of association, racial equality, freedom of religion, and
i' See 1976 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 118, at 7-11; but the State Department
noted this lack of cooperation, in 1977 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 111, at 127; see
also INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY THE
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HuMAN RIGHTS AT ITS THIRTIETH SESSION, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/11.30, Doc. 45, rev. 1, at 50 (1973).
M See 1976 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 118, at 19.
'2 See Amnesty International, Briefing on Iran 10 (1976).
"2 See notes 111 and 124 supra.
12, See 1976 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 118; see also 1977 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS, supra note 111.
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property rights. The reports do not explain why some rights were
separately treated, why some were barely mentioned as to a few
countries, but omitted for others, and why many (even those in the
Universal Declaration) were never mentioned at all. 25
The Department was apparently attempting to restrict
"internationally recognized human rights" to the rights mentioned
in the section 502B definition of "gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights" which "includes"
torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant
denial of the right of life, liberty, or the security of person .... 2I
This clause, however, is a definition of "gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights," which might trigger a termi-
nation of aid under section 502B(a)(2). The clause is not intended
to limit the reporting provision of section 502B. The State Depart-
ment is required by section 502B(c)(1)(A) to report "all available
information about observance of and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedom in that country . . .'" ' and by section
502B(b) to provide a "full and complete report. . . with respect to
practices regarding the observance of and respect for internationally
recognized human rights .... "1'18 Accordingly, it appears evident
that the State Department report is far too restrictive.
"' Cf. Human Rights in Uruguay and Paraguay, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Organizations of the House Comm. on International Organizations of the House
Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1976) (testimony of Ronald
Palmer, former Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights).
1- 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(d)(1) (emphasis added).
The use of the word "includes," however, in connection with the examples provided in
subsection (f) suggests that not all the rights included within the parameters of 502B are
identified; nor are "internationally recognized" human rights necessarily limited to those
documents from which the illustrations are drawn.
In drafting this language, Congress appears to have had in mind two parts of the Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See note 116 supra. Some of the phrasing of section
502B is identical to that found in the Universal Declaration and Covenant. For example,
article 5 of the Declaration refers to "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;"
and article 3 protects the right to "life, liberty and the security of person."
The examples provided in section 502B also parallel closely rights safeguarded in the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 7 of the Covenant refers, for example, to
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Article 9 refers to "life, liberty and
the security of person." Article 9 also contains a guarantee of an individual's right to be
promptly informed of all charges brought against him and the right to a prompt trial.
1- 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
In Id. § 2304(b).
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Indeed, in view of the emphasis in section 502B(a)(1) placed on
"human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without discrimi-
nation as to race, sex, language, or religion," it is particularly diffi-
cult to understand the State Department's failure to stress at least
these equality issues in their reports. In any case, the State Depart-
ment's previous statements as to the scope of "internationally rec-
ognized human rights" and the best considered understanding of
the legislative language indicate that the recent reports do not fulfill
the legislative mandate. The State Department's selection of cer-
tain rights from the Universal Declaration is also troublesome, be-
cause the selection suggests an emphasis on certain United States
preferred rights among "internationally recognized" human
rights.'2 9
Section 502B(c) also requires that the Secretary of State set forth
the steps the United States has taken to:
(i) Promote respect for an observance of human rights in that
country and discourage any practices which are inimical to inter-
nationally recognized human rights, and
(ii) Publicly or privately call attention to or disassociate the
United States and any security assistance provided for such coun-
try from, such practices . . . .
Again, it should be noted that the reports should include United
States policies which discourage or disassociate our government
from "any practices inimical to internationally recognized human
rights" - not merely foreign government practices and not merely
in regard to military assistance."'
The 1976 report describes a relatively impressive array of United
States human rights activity, including private diplomatic contacts
at various levels of government and on different human rights sub-
jects.3 2 Although these measures have not been applied uniformly,
'1' 123 CONG. REc. S2641 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1977) (remarks of Senator Jackson urging that
freedom of emigration is the most fundamental of rights protected by the Universal Declara-
tion).
' 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 2304(c)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
"' Also included are monitoring the observance of human rights in aid-recipient countries,
inquiries about specific prisoners, a few public statements by United States government
officials, the delivery of United States human rights legislation to foreign government officials
at various levels, United States Information Service distribution of general State Department
pronouncements on human rights, the transmission of these pronouncements to government
officials, congressional hearings, briefings of foreign press on United States human rights
[Vol. 7:231
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those listed are suggestive of the sorts of human rights actions the
State Department has been willing during the previous two or three
years to undertake. Unfortunately, section 502B does not require the
Department to analyze the effectiveness of these measures in
achieving human rights observance or discouraging "practices inim-
ical" to human rights. Such an analysis of effectiveness might help
to gauge the appropriateness of the measures already taken and to
assist the Congress in determining whether aid should be continued.
Instead, section 502B(c)(1) requires only that the Secretary of
State indicate whether, notwithstanding practices inimical to
human rights:
(i) Extraordinary circumstances exist which necessitate a con-
tinuation of security assistance for such country, and, if so, a de-
scription of such circumstances and the extent to which such assis-
tance should be continued (subject to such conditions as Congress
may impose under this section), and
(ii) On all facts it is in the national interest of the United
States to provide such assistance . . . .
The section does not specify what might constitute "extra-
ordinary circumstances" or "the national interest." Although it
might be difficult to establish principles which could cover the
variegated United States relations with all aid recipients, these
phrases are so vague as to invite administrative abuse. Indeed, the
1976 State Department report easily concludes in regard to all six
countries that the "national interest" requires the continuation of
all security assistance, despite allegations of human rights viola-
tions.' 34
attitudes, exchange programs during which human rights speakers have been presented to
foreign audiences, and the structuring of military aid, particularly in regard to training of
personnel and weapon sales, to avoid any application of the aid to internal security or police
activities, which might involve torture or other human rights violations. See 1976 STATE
DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 118, at 4, 5, 9-10, 15, 16, 21, 26, 31.
" 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(c)(1).
In its litany of justifications, the Department identified several of the competing goals
of United States foreign policy: the generalized desire to keep "communication" with the
dominant sector of each country so as to ensure other United States interests. 1976 STATE
DEPARTMENr REPoRT, supra note 118, at 6, 27, 33; the need for raw materials, for example,
food, uranium, and oil, id. at 22; the need to safeguard United States investments, id. at 6;
and loans, id. at 6; the desire to maintain United States influence with powerful or potentially
powerful nations, id. at 16; the need to safeguard the military security of the United States,
id. at 16, 32; its foreign military bases, id. at 11, 32; and U.S. allies, id. at 22, 32; the desire
for "regional stability," id. at 17, 22, 32; and the wish to maintain general confidence over
United States security commitments, id. at 27, 33.
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Nevertheless, there were some shades of difference between the
report on Argentina, for example, and the other reports. As to Ar-
gentina, the 1976 report foreshadows the Carter Administration's
later decision to limit military aid to Argentina under section
502B(a)(2)1'1:
The Department of State is of the opinion at this time that it is in
the national interest of the United States to provide continued
security assistance to Argentina. The Department is monitoring
the situation closely.' 36
The conclusion on Indonesia is more supportive of aid:
The Department of State believes that it is in the interest of re-
gional security and continued good United States-Indonesian rela-
tions to try to be responsive to Indonesia, particularly at this time
when it feels increasingly concerned about its national security.
Specifically, the Department is of the opinion that continuation of
our security assistance program to Indonesia is in the U.S. national
interest. 31
None of the declarations as to the need for continued assistance,
however, set forth "extraordinary circumstances;" the State De-
partment could make similar representations in regard to almost
Many of these human rights, economic, military, or political goals are very similar, but may
be expressed in somewhat different ways or may be addressed to longer or shorter time spans.
Furthermore, the State Department document seems to insist that every other goal must take
precedence over human rights. The Department, however, did not even purport to rely upon
national security considerations in regard to at least three countries - Peru, Haiti, and
Argentina. Instead, they invoked more general concepts of United States national interest or
expressed doubt as to the efficacy of aid terminations for achieving human rights goals. Bruce
Cameron, testifying on behalf of the Americans for Democratic Action before a Senate Sub-
committee, argued for a limited definition of national security. Testimony of Bruce Cameron
before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Mar.
4, 1977) (unpublished statement).
Nowhere was there a pragmatic balancing of human rights, economic, political and military
objectives, as required by section 502B(a)(1). Perhaps, this failure was due to the apparently
overwhelming desire of the State Department to prevent the termination of military aid for
any country. But section 502B does not require automatic termination upon a finding of
human rights violations. Instead, it allows a panoply of human rights techniques. The restric-
tion and termination of military aid are only two of the most extreme measures which might
be taken.
'11 Oberdorfer, In Rights Push, Vance Asks Cuts to 3 Countries, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1977,
§A, at 1, col. 3; Gwertzman, U.S. Cuts Foreign Aid in Rights Violations; South Korea
Exempt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
' 1976 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 118, at 6.
,3 Id. at 16-17.
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every country of the world. Such circumstances can hardly be
"extraordinary."
As Congress accumulates more experience under section 502B,
there may be a need to enforce, amend and tighten these provisions
so as not to allow the State Department quite so much latitude. In
the meantime, however, section 502B(c) (1) (D) permits either House
of the Congress or the respective committees on foreign relations to
ask the Secretary of State for "such other information as such com-
mittee or House may request." Accordingly, the Congress may be
able to resolve some of the interpretation problems in the statute
by making more specific requests for reports: for example, Congress
may specify that the report must state which internationally recog-
nized human rights, which sorts of information, and which factors
the State Department considered in analyzing the national interest.
Indeed, Congress might want to require the State Department to
make a reasoned conclusion as to whether "all available informa-
tion" indicates that a government "is engaging in a consistent pat-
tern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.'"3
'- 22 U.S.C.A. § 2304(c)(1)(D), (a)(2). The State Department might also be pressured to
be more honest in evaluating and reporting the information it possesses. For example, a con-
gressional committee could conduct oversight hearings and cross-examine the officials who
drafted the reports. See note 29 supra. Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 2
U.S.C.A. § 190(d) (Pamph. Supp. 1975), Congress gave its committees broad oversight au-
thority to "review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and
execution of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction
of that committee." This oversight function is founded in substantial legislative practice (see
60 Stat. 812 (1946) repealed by 84 Stat. 1172 (1970)) and has been implied from the Constitu-
tion. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S.
135, 137 (1927). No one has apparently questioned the authority of congressional committees
to hold hearings on the human rights situation in countries which receive foreign aid or might
receive such aid in the future.
For a general discussion of congressional oversight responsibilities, see the following:
SHAPIRO, JUDICIAL REVIEW: POLITICAL REALITY AND LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
SUPERVISION OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 535, 542-47 (1962); Bibby, Committee Charac-
teristics and Legislative Oversight of Administration, 10 MIDWEST J. POL. Sc. 78, 97-98
(1966); MacMahon, Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse, 58
POL. SCI. Q. 161-65 (1943); Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of the
Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 CAUF. L. REv. 565, 567-70 (when
congressional interference with administrative actions appropriate, 570-84 (limitations on
the scope of congressional oversight) (1953); Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Con-
gressional Function, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 277, 278-79 (1975). Alternatively, the General Ac-
counting Office might be asked to investigate the process by which the reports were prepared.
See 2 U.S.C. § 190(d) (1970). While even stronger measures are available, it is doubtful that
Congress possesses the political will to take more coercive measures. For example, Congress
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Since section 502B(c) permits very little time (30 days) for re-
sponse and requires considerable information, the Congress must be
relatively sparing in making requests if the Department is to pro-
duce adequate reports. The poor reports produced thus far may also
be evidence of the inadequate attention and staffing the Depart-
ment has devoted to human rights.'39 In any case, careful choice as
to when a report should be requested on a certain country and more
precision in making the requests might lighten the administrative
burden, give a little more certainty to such phrases as
"internationally recognized human rights," and possibly make the
reporting provisions of section 502B more meaningful.
E. Other Legislative Measures for Human Rights
In addition to the more general human rights provisions of sec-
tions 116 and 502B, Congress has also experimented with other mea-
sures addressed to human rights violations.4 ° For example, Con-
gress provided pressure for the Soviet Union and other communist
countries to discontinue restrictive emigration practices. The Trade
Act of 1974 authorizes the President to extend most-favored-nation
status to those nonmarket economy countries which do not deny
their citizens the right to emigrate.' Congress also passed a similar
might withhold funding from the State Department until it complies with congressional
directives. For a historical perspective on the relations between Congress and the State
Department, see H. CARROLL, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 154-93
(1958); see also F. WILSON & R. FRANK, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
66-82 (1976); Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making under the APA,
71 MICH. L. REv. 221 (1972).
,3' See note 35 supra.
140 See note 38 supra. Anti-boycott legislation is yet another measure designed to protect
against human rights violations - particularly religious discrimination. See 1 BoYcoTr REPORT
1 (Mar. 1977); U.S. Department of State, Statement of Secretary of State, Mar. 1, 1977, at
1-2.
14l 19 U.S.C.A. § 2432 (1977 Supp.):
SEC. 402. FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION IN EAST-WEST TRADE.
(a) To assure the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental
human rights, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act products from any nonmarket economy country shall
not be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation treat-
ment), such country shall not participate in any program of the Government of the
United States which extends credits or credit guarantees or investment guarantees,
directly or indirectly, and the President of the United States shall not conclude any
commercial agreement with any country, during the period beginning with the date
on which the President determines that such country -
(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;
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restriction on Export-Import Bank credits' for the Soviet Union to
encourage Jewish emigration.
These measures raise very difficult issues of evenhandedness and
effectiveness. The legislation is addressed principally to one group
of nations which have been adversaries to the United States. The
legislation deals with one particular human right of considerable
interest to the United States.4 3 As a result, the socialist nations
might well conclude that this legislation is not part of a concern for
human rights, but constitutes a new phase in the Cold War propa-
ganda competition.'
Indeed, there is evidence that diplomatic efforts were succeeding
in obtaining freer emigration from the Soviet Union until the inter-
vention of Congress. "5 The Soviet Union took such offense at the
(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas
or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause
whatsoever; or
(3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge
on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate
to the country of his choice,
and ending on the date on which the President determines that such country is no
longer in violation of paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
(b) After the date of the enactment of this Act, (A) products of a nonmarket
economy country may be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory treatment (most-
favored-nation treatment), (B) such country may participate in any program of the
Government of the United States which extends credits or credit guarantees or
investment guarantees, and (C) the President may conclude a commercial agree-
ment with such country, only after the President has submitted to the Congress a
report indicating that such country is not in violation of paragraph (1), (2), or (3)
of subsection (a). Such report with respect to such country shall include informa-
tion as to the nature and implementation of emigration laws and policies and
restriction or discrimination applied to or against persons wishing to emigrate. The
report required by this subsection shall be submitted initially as provided herein
and, with current information, on or before each June 30 and December 31 there-
after so long as such treatment is received, such credits or guarantees are extended,
or such agreement is in effect.
The President is authorized to waive the application of subsections (a) and (b) if he reports
to Congress that the waiver would "substantially promote the objectives of this section" and
that he has received assurances that future emigration practices would achieve the objectives.
Id. § 402(c).
"2 Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974 § 8(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 635e(b) (Supp. 1976).
The provision imposes a limit of $300,000,000 on the amount of credits and guarantees that
could be provided for United States exports to the Soviet Union. The President may establish
a higher limitation if approved by concurrent resolution of Congress.
", See text at notes 181-90 infra.
" See note 182 infra.
Congress and United States - Soviet Relations, Report of a Conference Between Mem-
bers of the U.S. Senate and Delegates to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, 94th Cong.,
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Jackson and Stevenson Amendments that Jewish emigration has
slowed since enactment. 4 ' Nevertheless, there is some evidence that
Romania responded favorably to the provisions and has permitted
greater emigration.147
The returns are not evident from these efforts but they do point
to the apparently fewer alternative measures available for human
rights implementation vis-a-vis the socialist nations. Most socialist
countries do not receive United States aid. Accordingly, there is a
risk that an overdependence on aid as a human rights mechanism
may make the United States less evenhanded in its promotion of
human rights-concentrating only on aid-recipients.
1st Sess. 5-8 (Comm. Print Nov. 1975) (staff of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations);
Reassessment of U.S. Foreign Policy, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Future Foreign
Policy Research and Development of House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23-24 (1975) (testimony of W. Averell Harriman). See Kissinger News Conference
at Dallas, Mar. 23, 1976, 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. 469 (1976). Emigration of Soviet Jews has
sharply declined from approximately 38,000 in 1973 to 20,000 in 1974, and 13,000 in 1975. The
Soviet Government has failed to act on 130,000 requests for exit visas, some of which were
submitted five years ago or more. 122 CONG. Rxc. H4436 (daily ed. May 17, 1976) (remarks
of Rep. Drinan). Further, no increase in emigration has occurred since the Soviet Union
signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki
Agreement) on August 1, 1975, despite the language of part III which affirms that "the
participating states will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of
persons who wish to be re-united with members of their family." Id. at 4436-37. In order "to
monitor the acts of the signatories which reflect compliance with or violation of [the Helsinki
Agreement], with particular regard to the provisions relating to Cooperation in Humanitar-
ian Fields," Congress recently established the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. Pub. L. No. 94-304, §§ 1, 2 (June 3, 1976). The Commission, comprised of House
and Senate members and administration officials, is empowered to subpoena witnesses and
records and is required to periodically report to Congress. Id. § § 3, 4, 6. See FIRST SEMIANNUAL
REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION TO EUROPE TO THE COMMISSION ON
SECURrrY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
"I Meeker, Foreign Policy and Human Rights, 69 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 255, 257-58
(1975). Senator Jackson also believes that the Soviet government only reduced emigration
after Secretary Kissinger gave the Soviet Union reason to hope that resistance might contrib-
ute to the demise of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. 123 CONG. REc. S2641-42 (daily ed. Feb.
11, 1977).
"I The Romanian Government approved over 2,000 exit visas for Jewish emigration to
Israel during the period from January through July, 1975, and over 750 visas for emigration
to the United States. 121 CONG. Rec. H7619 (daily ed. July 28, 1975). See Trade Benefit for
Romania Asked in View of Visa Policy, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1975, at 32, col. 3. Following
the waiver of §§402(a), (b) of the Trade Act of 1974 by President Ford, Congress approved
the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment for products of Romania. S. Con. Res. No. 35,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. H7629 (daily ed. July 28, 1975), but see 123 CONG. REC.
H2538 (daily ed. March 23, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Koch); Romania-US. trade deal likely
to be extended, Christian Sc. Monitor, Sept. 21, 1976, at 28, cols. 1-3.
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If the United States human rights efforts are to be credible and
effective, they must be perceived by every nation as motivated by
a genuine desire to improve the observance of human rights and not
motivated by political dominance of the Third World or by Cold
War competition with the Soviet Union. Hence, it is very important
that United States human rights legislation and overall United
States human rights conduct be as evenhanded as possible and
partake of internationally recognized norms and international pro-
cedures.
In addition, trade sanctions do not have a very encouraging record
of success.' For example, experience under the League of Nations
sanctions against the Italian invasion of Ethiopia'49 and the United
Nations Security Council efforts on Rhodesia'50 suggest that one
"' See, e.g., MacDonald, Economic Sanctions in the International System, [1969] CAN.
Y.B. OF INT'L L. 61, 80; Taubenfield & Taubenfield, 58 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 183, 196-201
(1964). A full consideration of the effectiveness of national and international sanctions must
fall outside the scope of this article. Similarly, issues as to whether trade, aid, or other human
rights measures might involve impermissible intervention into the internal affairs of other
nations or might constitute impermissible coercion at international law must be deferred to
another day. See U.N. Charter, arts. 2(3), 2(4), 2(7), supra note 15; see, e.g., R. HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
58-130 (1963); Dons, Is the Question of Human Rights a Domestic Matter, Jus GENTIUM I, 77
(1949); Lauterpacht, The International Protection of Human Rights, 70 HAGUE ACADEMY INT'L
L.: RECEUIL DES CouRs 5, 19 (1947); Watson, Auto-interpretation, Competence, and the Con-
tinuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 84 (1977); Wright, Is
Discussion Intervention?, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 102-10 (1956); Report of the United Nations
Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa, 8 GAOR, Supp. No. 16
A/2505 and A/2505/Add. 1, at 16-34; see Gross, Domestic Jurisdiction, Enforcement Measures
and the Congo, [1965] AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 137; Preuss, Article 2(7) of the Charter of the
United Nations and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 74 HAGUE ACADEMY INT'L L.: RECUEIL
DES COURS 553 (1949); Ross, The Proviso Concerning "Domestic Jurisdiction" in Article 2(7)
of the Charter of the United Nations, 2 OsTERO. ZErr. RECHT 562 (1950); Comment, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 983, 993-96, 1006-10 (1974); J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICTS 58-60 (1954); Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1, 9-10 (1972). Cf. Partridge, Political and Economic Coercion: Within the Ambit of Article
52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties?, 5 INT'L LAw. 755, 761-67; 58 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. PROC. 217 (1964) (remarks of Professor Fisher); MacDonald, Economic Sanctions in
the International System, [1969] CAN. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 61. See also General Assembly
Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, G.A.
Ras. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6220 (1965); The Declaration on
Friendly Relations, G.A. Ras. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970);
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See also Bowett, International Law and Economic
Coercion, 12 VA. J. INT'L. L. 245 (1976).
"I Taubenfield & Taubenfield, The Economic Weapon: The League and the United
Nations, 58 AM. Soc. INT'L L. Poc. 183, 184-86 (1964).
'* See, e.g. L. KAPUNGA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA
129 (1971).
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must not expect too much impact from trade restrictions. Instead,
trade sanctions might be seen as a way of demonstrating world
disapproval; if the sanctions actually have some practical effect, so
much the better. But trade sanctions cannot be expected to bring
the target government immediately into obedience.
Accordingly, trade and trade credit provisions for implementing
human rights, such as the Stevenson and Jackson amendments, can
not be off-handedly dismissed as failures or recommended as pana-
ceas. They are merely one set of measures for consideration with
other alternatives in an overall inventory of possible human rights
actions.
III. UNITED STATES HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES
The first months of 1977 have been very lively in the attention
devoted to human rights. First, for example, there were several gen-
eral statements, including the Inaugural Address'5' and the United
Nations speech of March 17th, 5 2 expressing concern for human
rights and committing the United States to ratification of the
United Nations Human Rights Covenants. Second, the State De-
partment asked fervently for and achieved the repeal of the Byrd
Amendment.'53 Third, there have been public statements on specific
human rights problems, for example, in Czechoslovakia, Cuba,
Namibia, Rhodesia, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and Uganda. 54
01 123 CONG. REC. S1131 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1977).
52 Address by President Carter, United Nations, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1977,
at 10, col. 1; see also note 3 supra.
1- Pub. L. No. 94-12 (March 18, 1977). Exec. Order 11978, 42 Fed. Reg. 15403 (Mar. 22,
1977); see Lescaze, Vance Urges Halting of Chrome Imports to Press Rhodesia, Wash. Post,
Feb. 11, 1977, §A, at 2, col. 1; Hovey, Vance Begins Drive to End U.S. Imports of Rhodesian
Chrome, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1977, at 1, col. 1; see generally Scott, Rhodesian Chrome Ban
Made Law, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1977, §A, at 2, col. 5; Lyons, House Approves Authority to
Bar Rhdesia Chrome, Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 1977, §A, at 1, col. 5.
Is' See, e.g., Gwertzman, Carter Encouraged by Soviet on Arms; Adamant on Rights, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 23, 1977, at 1, col. 1; U.S. Joins Vote Condemning Chile Rights Violations, St.
Paul Pioneer Press, Mar. 10, 1977, at 7, col. 1; U.S. at Geneva: Isolate S. Africa, Wash. Post,
Mar. 1, 1977, §D, at 11, col. 1; Carter: Uganda Actions 'Have Disgusted' the World, Wash.
Post, Feb. 24, 1977, §A, at 8, col. 1; Wren, Sakharov Receives Carter Letter Affirming Com-
mitment on Rights, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, at 3, col. 1; Scott, Carter Outlines Basis
for Better Ties with Cuba, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1977, §A, at 1, col. 5; Birder, Carter Says
Cubans May Leave Angola, Is Receptive on Ties, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 6; U.S.
Extends Actions on Soviet Rights to U.N., Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1977, §A, at 2, col. 3; U.S.
Tells "Profound Concern" Over the Detention of Ginzburg, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1977, §A, at
3, col. 1; Gwertzman, U.S. Again comments on Soviet Dissident, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1977,
at 1, col. 2; Gwertzman, Carter Discusses Human Rights and Arms Issues with Dobrynin,
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Fourth, the Administration requested a reliably accused torturer
from Chile to abbreviate his State Department-sponsored tour to
the United States. 55 Fifth, the Administration, pursuant to section
502B, voluntarily limited military assistance for Argentina, Ethio-
pia, and Uruguay on human rights grounds. 56 Sixth, the Adminis-
tration issued Human Rights Reports on 82 countries as required by
section 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act. 157
These efforts are a tribute to the new Administration's concern for
human rights and a vindication of the work of Congress for the last
several years.'58 It is necessary, however, to explicate United States
human rights policies in some detail and in the context of an overall
human rights strategy under section 502B(a)(1). Ad hoc action is
not policy and is no replacement for a more predictable and more
regularized approach to human rights. 5 ' Without such a considered
strategy, United States actions will be less effective,6 0 vulnerable to
charges of a double standard,' and subject to unnecessary risks of
retribution. 62
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Marder, Vance Warns Rhodesia, Wash. Post, Feb. 1,
1977, §A at 1, Col. 5; Carter Backs But Didn't Clear the Statement on Sakharov, Wash. Post,
Jan. 31, 1977, §A, at 4, col. 2; U.S. Cautions Soviet on Sakharov Curbs, N.Y. Times, Jan.
28, 1977, at 1, col. 3; Gwertzman, U.S. Asserts Prague Violates Covenants About Human
Rights, N.Y. Times, Jan 27, 1977, at 1, col. 1; see also statement of Philip Habib before the
House Subcommittee on African Affairs (Mar. 3, 1977) (unpublished statement).
1 DeYoung, Alleged Chilean Torturer Asked to Cut Short U.S. Visit, Wash. Post, Jan. 29,
1977, §A at 13, col. 1.
' Oberdorfer, In Rights Push, Vance Asks Cuts to Three Countries, Wash. Post, Feb. 25,
1977, §A, at 1, col. 3; Gwertzman, US. cuts Foreign Aid in Rights Violations; South Korea
Exempt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
" 1977 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, supra note 111.
10 See Smith, Carter's Diplomacy in Public Causing Questions and Complications, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 1977, at 6, col. 1; G. Aldrich, A Sensible Human Rights Policy, Dec. 7, 1976,
at 1 (unpublished memorandum).
"I Cf. Rosenfeld, The Risks of Human Rights Policy, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1977, §A, at 23,
col. 1.
IN Soviet Press, TV Strikes Back, Hits U.S. for Rights Violations, Wash. Post, Feb. 22,
1977, §A, at 14, col. 1; Osnos, Brezhnev Attacks Interference, Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 1977, §A,
at 1, col. 3; Cf. Willis, Soviets Criticize Carter by Name on Many Issues, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Mar. 14, 1977, at 1, Col. 1. See, e.g., Shipler, Moscow, Criticized on Dissidents, Cites
U.S. Shortcomings, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Gwertzman, Russ Avails Vance
on Rights Stance, Minneapolis Trib., Mar. 29, 1977, §A, at 3, col. 2; Hofmann, Prague
Spokesman Says Dissidence is Being Fanned from Abroad, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1977, at 6,
col. 1.
"I U.S. Department of State, Press Conference of Secretary of State, Jan. 31, 1977, at 3
(question of Marvin Kalb).
14 E.g., Reporter Held; US. Protests to Prague, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1977, §A, at 12, col.
1; Marder, Dobrynin Cautions Vance on Support of Sakharov, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1977, §A,
at 2 col. 1.
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There may be no way of preventing these problems, but it might
be possible to improve the credibility, effectiveness, and evenhand-
edness of the human rights concern of the United States govern-
ment, if some general approach to human rights can be formulated.
Such a general approach to human rights action under section 502B
must commence with a definition of this country's goals, including
the reasons for promoting the observance of human rights, a review
of the most effective methods for achieving these goals, and at least
a tentative choice of the methods most appropriate to particular
human rights situations.
President Carter, in his first speech before the United Nations set
forth the most authoritative recent restatement of United States
foreign policy objectives:
These then are our basic priorities as we work with other mem-
bers to strengthen and to improve the United Nations:
First, we will strive for peace in the troubled areas of the world.
Second, we will aggressively seek to control the weaponry of war.
Third, we will promote a new system of international economic
progress and cooperation.
And fourth, we will be steadfast in our dedication to the dignity
and well-being of people throughout the world.
I believe that this is a foreign policy that is consistent with my
own nation's historic values and commitments. I believe it is a
foreign policy that is consonant with the ideals of the United Na-
tions.'13
It should be noted that human rights sits fourth-not first-
within this ordering of foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, the
ranking does not appear to have made the Carter Administration
conclude that human rights must always be subordinated to other
goals, such that the human rights goal never affects policy. Human
rights goals may be consistent with other objectives or may be so
strong in some cases as to demand priority.
There are several reasons for giving human rights priority in spe-
cific circumstances: since respect for fundamental rights is basic to
United States national traditions, any foreign policy which conflicts
with these American values may fail for lack of popular support.'64
"' See note 152 supra.
aI See Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, in THE VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 751 (R. Falk ed. 1976); B. Cameron, Human Rights and Security
Assistance, Feb. 4, 1977, at 1 (unpublished memorandum).
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Identification with repressive regimes may harm the United States
image in the world.' 5 Human rights violations should be avoided,
because they may, at least in very egregious cases, lead to war.' 6
Regimes that violate the human rights of their citizens may there-
fore be politically unstable, thus presenting risks to peace, trade and
investment. 6 ' If the United States assists a government to engage
in repression, the former victims may eventually take power and
may not be particularly friendly to the countries which aided the
former oppressors. The United States may thus lose access to natu-
ral resources, military facilities and other opportunities.'68 Some
American citizens may fall victims to human rights violations by
foreign governments.' 9 Respect for human rights may form the
foundations for good relations among the community of nations
which share these concerns.7 0 And perhaps most importantly, the
United States has an international obligation under the United Na-
tions Charter, as reaffirmed by section 502B(a)(1), to promote the
observance of international human rights."'
In regard to each country, United States policy planners must
balance the competing objectives and derive a considered strategy
in the light of all the available measures. The analyst must consider
the potential for each country to improve its observance of and
respect for internationally recognized human rights. It is then neces-
sary to complete an inventory of all the bilateral and multilateral
65 Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership, supra note 29, at
1.
88 See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan, at 97
(1971).
"87 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE 79 (1975) (Greece under the
Colonels). Of course, this consideration might be subject to abuse, if human rights were not
considered to include economic rights.
"IS See, e.g., Revolution into Democracy, Portugal After the Coup: Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-90 (1976).
"' de Onis, Argentina Beset by Arrest Queries, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1976, at 5, col. 1; Ex-
Minneapolis Woman Jailed in Argentina, Minneapolis Trib., May 18, 1976, §A, at 8, col. 3;
5 Americans Held in Yugoslav Jails, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1976, at 5, col. 3.
170 See, e.g., The Atlantic Charter, 55 Stat. 1603 (1942), E.A.S. No. 236, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, entered into force Sept. 30, 1961, [1961] 12 U.S.T.
1728, U.S. T.I.A.S. 4891; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, done Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953.
"' See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, [1971] I.C.J. 16, reprinted in 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1972); see generally S. W.
Africa Opinion of the ICJ: A Symposium, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1972); Brown, 1971
Advisory Opinion on Southwest Africa, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1971).
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measures available to the United States for promoting the observ-
ance of internationally recognized human rights.'72 Once all the al-
ternative measures are known, the country analyst can begin to ask
some of the harder questions:7 3
1. Will any particular measure be helpful in achieving an im-
provement in the observance of internationally recognized human
rights?' 74
2. What would be the most effective way of implementing the
measure?' 75
3. What are the risks and benefits for the United States, third
countries, and international organizations?'7
112 See generally M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
30-31 (1961); N. PALMER & H. PERKINS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 160-78 (2d ed. 1957); testi-
mony of Edward F. Snyder, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Before the Sub-
comm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Mar. 4, 1977 (unpub-
lished statement); International League for Human Rights, Report of the Conference on
Implementing a Human Rights Commitment in United States Foreign Policy, Mar. 4, 1977;
G. Aldrich. A Sensible Human Rights Policy, Dec. 7, 1976, at 6-14 (unpublished memoran-
dum); cf., e.g., Hoagland, S. Africa, With U.S. Aid, NearA-Bomb, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1977,
§A, at 12, col. 1.
,,I For a first effort at similar policy questions, see W. Christopher, Deputy Secretary of
State, Opening Remarks before Humphrey Subcommittee, March 7, 1977 (unpublished state-
ment); see also address of former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Rogers, Pan American Society, Boston, Nov. 4, 1975.
" For example, will the measure be seen by the government violating human rights as such
a threat to its existence that the government may become even more oppressive? Will outside
pressure generate a popular reaction in support of the government's repressive policies or at
least create an excuse for more oppression to resist the external threat? Or will the measure
encourage the human rights victims and other sympathetic persons in the affected nation?
Is the human rights problem structural or capable of shorter term resolution? To what extent
will the measure be acceptable to the criticized government and to the victims, because the
measure embodies principles recognized by the world community and (at least in other
contexts) by the government?
"' For example, should the United States act alone? Should it attempt to obtain the
cooperation of other governments in taking parallel action? Should the U.S. act only in
concert with other governments rather than pursuing an overt leadership role? Should the
United States invoke international human rights procedures of intergovernmental organiza-
tions which require international consensus? Should the United States ask the assistance of
nongovernmental organizations and the good offices of respected individuals? Is international
cooperation anticipated? What governments, organizations, or individuals would be the most
effective in achieving human rights progress? Even if there is a small chance that the United
States action will be successful, should the United States speak out or take other action
anyway, because silence or inaction would violate United States or world values?
"I What sorts of retaliation might be anticipated? What countermeasures or precautions
are available? How serious would be the impact of retaliation on United States interests or
of countermeasures on peoples in other countries? To what extent must the American public
and others be prepared for retaliation so as to avoid undercutting support for the initial
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4. If the measure is successful, what action would the United
States be willing to take alone or together with others to reinforce
further observance of internationally recognized human rights?'77
5. If the measure is unsuccessful or is not expected to succeed
alone, how long or with what frequency should the measure be
applied?7 8
These initial questions may require refinement and supplementa-
tion as the United States government accumulates experience in
promoting human rights. The formulation of policy cannot proceed
without a thorough review of the available measures for human
rights implementation and a careful study of each country in which
those measures may be applied.'79 But a typical pattern of bilateral
and multilateral actions for a particular country might begin with
diplomatic communications; then if necessary, public comment by
increasingly more important officials; then invocation of domestic
or international fact-finding procedures; then sending of United
States or international observers; then perhaps, restructuring of for-
eign aid programs; if human rights problems persist, threat of aid
termination or reduction; and more coercive measures.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new Administration has begun to implement some aspects of
the congressional human rights legislation. This United States
human rights campaign may have two basic objectives - one for-
eign and one domestic. Administration strategists may have de-
cided that the United States must have a positive international
rallying call, rather than the tired, negative imperative of anti-
communism. In this view the United States will talk about human
measure? What other harms to U.S. interests can be anticipated? How critical are those
interests in the short, middle, or long-term in comparison with the objective sought by the
human rights measure? What are the risks and benefits for other countries? Would the use
of an international procedure strengthen the procedure for better overall promotion of respect
for human rights? Or would a measure discredit or disrupt the function of human rights
institutions?
"I What evidence will the United States accept as indications of success or failure? Is the
United States in search of quick success or will it accept long-term improvement? What time
perspective would be the best for the human rights victims?
"I' Are there other measures which would work well in tandem or in sequence with the first
action?
' It appears the process of creating such an inventory may have begun at least in the State
Department. See Cyrus Vance, Memorandum for All Assistant Secretaries, Feb. 11, 1977,
reprinted in 1 CHECKLIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS, App. D (Dec. 1976).
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rights, just as the Soviets or the Third World raise exploitation and'
imperialism as their issues. In other words, human rights can be
used as a legitimating theory for other American foreign policies.
The domestic objective is quite related to the foreign goal. The
dual traumas of Watergate and Vietnam have caused the United
States populace a loss of confidence in its leadership and role in the
world community. The Administration's advisors may believe that
human rights can provide a sense of purpose and unity for the Amer-
ican people. 80 Accordingly, the human rights campaign may not
necessarily be directed toward promoting greater observance of
human rights, so much as achieving other United States foreign
and domestic policy goals.
Seen in their most favorable light, however, all the human rights
efforts of the first months of the Administration may only have been
designed to make a clear demarcation between this Administration
and its predecessors. Also, the Carter Administration may have
wanted to establish the credibility of its desire to improve human
rights and its willingness to use publicity or even more coercive
measures for human rights implementation.
Even if the President's desire is purely to encourage greater re-
spect for human rights, other countries and the media are not per-
ceiving his activities in a way conducive to the achievement of that
desire.'' The socialist countries apparently view the human rights
campaign as a new phase in the Cold War propaganda competi-
tion. 82 Third World countries may see the policy as a form of moral
neo-imperialism.'
Human rights advocates have labored long to defend human
rights from charges that the concept is entirely Western.'84 More
See Standing Firm Somewhere, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1977, at 18, col. 1.
"' Indeed, there is some indication that Carter advisors may see the present human rights
campaign as a way to reassert Administration leadership and end congressional control. As
George Aldrich, Deputy Legal Advisor of the State Department suggested, the new Adminis-
tration "needs to win the trust of the American people and Congress so that it can in due
course gain freedom from the Harkin Amendment and remain free from other mandatory
sanctions." G. Aldrich, A Sensible Human Rights Policy, Dec. 7, 1976, at 6 (unpublished
memorandum).
19S2 See, e.g. Bacon, Vance's Moscow Visit Will Test Carter Stand on Human Rights, Wall
St. J., Mar. 24, 1977, at 1, col. 1; East Europe Plans Rights Retort, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977,
at 3, col. 2; Willis, Carter's Rights Push Straining Soviet Ties, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb.
14, 1977, at 1, col.1.
"1 See Carter's Morality Play, TIME, Mar. 7, 1977, at 10.
18 See generally Castberg, Natural Law and Human Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 14
[Vol. 7:231
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
universalist precedents for human rights principles have been found
in all the major world religions,8 5 in socialist thought,"6 and in the
traditions of Third World societies."7 Major human rights instru-
ments have been evolved in international forums through world
consensus. 8 International procedures have been painstakingly de-
veloped to apply these principles where world agreement will per-
mit. 89
The Carter human rights campaign presents a serious risk of im-
printing human rights with an unmistakable United States identifi-
cation. The work of human rights activists will consequently be
suspect as subservient to United States objectives. Perhaps, this
country cannot grasp an idea without making it into a crusade or
at least a campaign. Human rights problems are simply not suscep-
tible of such unsubtle, shock treatment. The United States can, and
should, make human rights an important factor in its foreign policy
pursuant to section 502B(a)(1) without turning human rights into
the central, dominant theme of United States relations with all
countries and all international institutions.
Put in the perspective of section 502B, the United States must
undertake a thorough reappraisal of its relations with all its allies
and competitors. Part of that new accounting will require an inven-
tory of all the available multilateral and bilateral methods to im-
prove human rights around the world. Once such an inventory is
assembled, it may be possible to consider which methods would be
most effective in which countries-as to which internationally rec-
(1968); McKeon, The Philosophic Bases and Material Circumstances of the Rights of Man,
in HUMAN RIGHTS (UNESCO Symposium 1949) at 35-46; H. LAUTERPACHT, THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 16-53 (1945).
"' See Hessen, The Rights of Man in Liberalism, Socialism and Communism (UNESCO),
in HUMAN RIGHTS (UNESCO Symposium 1949) at 117; Puntambekor, The Hindu Concept of
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS (UNESCO Symposium 1949) at 195-98.
I" See, e.g., Hessen, The Rights of Man in Liberalism, Socialism, and Communism, in
HUMAN RIGHTS (UNESCO Symposium) at 108-42; Sommerville, Comparison of Soviet and
Western Democratic Principles with Special Reference to Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS
(UNESCO Symposium 1949) at 152-55; Tchechko, The Conception of the Rights of Man in
The USSR Based on Official Documents, in HUMAN RIGHTs (UNESCO Symposium 1949) at
158-76; Przetacznik, L'Attitude Des Etats Socialistes a L'Egard De La Protection Interna-
tionale Des Droits De L'Homme, 7 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 175 (1974).
"I See, e.g., Zamudio, Latin American Procedures for the Protection of the Individual, 9
INT'L COMM. JuR. J. 61 (1968).
I See notes 26 and 116 supra.
I" See note 85 supra; see also, Fraser, Freedom and Foreign Policy, 26 FOREIGN POLICY 140,
151-53 (1977).
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ognized human rights. Sections 116 and 502B contribute several
significant measures to the United States human rights arsenal.
Before an inventory of human rights measures and a country-by-
country analysis is completed, it is very difficult to determine which
methods would be advisable or whether, for example, bilateral
methods should be used in preference to multilateral human rights
procedures. Nevertheless, multilateral efforts appear at present to
involve fewer risks for the human rights movement and for United
States interests. As to many countries and many human rights
problems, bilateral measures may appear at first attractive. For
example, the United States does not need any other government's
agreement to cut off economic or military aid. The United States
can make its human rights point forcefully and promptly. Nor does
the State Department or the President require international consen-
sus to comment upon or criticize human rights violations. But bilat-
eral action may present both moral and practical risks of ineffective-
ness, retaliation and accusations that United States actions are pol-
itically motivated.
Instead, by stressing "internationally recognized human rights,"
section 502B suggests that the United States should not try to set
its own traditions as an example for the world. Internationally rec-
ognized human rights, such as the International Bill of Human
Rights, implemented by international institutions such as the
United Nations Human Rights Commission, have a greater chance
of acceptance by the criticized country and by the world com-
munity. Multilateral action must rely upon the extremely feeble
international institutions available and upon the need for achieving
consensus among nations-some basically unsympathetic to human
rights. Such institutions as the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, the Subcommission on the Protection of Minorities
and the Prevention of Racial Discrimination, and the Organization
of American States' Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
do not presently boast very impressive records for human rights
implementation in concrete cases.'9 0 The United States should at-
tempt, nonetheless, to strengthen these international institutions
through contributions for more staff and through intelligent utiliza-
tion of their good offices.
190 Id.
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There are at least two serious barriers to United States support
for multilateral human rights initiatives rather than bilateral activi-
ties. The greatest barrier is general ignorance as to the existence of,
functioning of, and ways of achieving results through these interna-
tional human rights institutions. The second barrier is impatience.
Universal respect for human rights cannot be achieved immedi-
ately. National societies and their institutions which create human
rights violations are slow to change. Human rights cannot be the
subject of a successful campaign. Progress is achieved through an
incremental and carefully considered process.

